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USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

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KARL MARX CENTENNIAL IN AMERICA AND THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 83 (signed to press 23 Nov 83) pp 3-12

[Article by T. T. Timofeyev]

[Text] The present stage of world social development is distinguished by a pronounced clash between two tendencies. One reflects the imperial ambitions and reactionary militarist policy line of U.S. imperialist circles, blinded by their anticommunism. Ronald Reagan is attempting to carry ideological conflicts into the sphere of intergovernmental relations by appealing for an "end" to Marxism and alleging that it belongs on the "trash heap of history." What is more, the U.S. imperialists, as Comrade Yu. V. Andropov pointed out, "have now gone so far as to announce a 'crusade' against socialism as a social system."¹

Washington's adventuristic policy line is the opposite of the consistent policy of the Soviet Union and other peaceful states which are seeking--and by means of action, not words--an end to the arms race and a turn for the better in international affairs.

The policy of communists is founded on principled, strictly scientific bases. This has been cogently reaffirmed by the celebration of the Karl Marx Centennial throughout the world. During the course of numerous undertakings commemorating Karl Marx, it has been noted that the extremely important issues of the struggle for social progress and peace, which were first pointed out by the founder of scientific socialism, are now the focus of attention for all progressive and peaceful social forces. "The rich content of Marx' theories," Yu. V. Andropov wrote, "has been revealed much more extensively and thoroughly to us today than to his contemporaries."²

The increased interest of various population strata throughout the world in Marx' ideas and legacy is therefore understandable. This increased interest has not bypassed the American continent either, and there is evidence of this in the U.S. commemoration of the Karl Marx Centennial.

Of course, representatives of various classes and the ideological and political currents related to them have taken different approaches to the assessment of Marxism's history and to the definition of its main sources and elements,

the possibilities and prospects of its creative development as an integral revolutionary doctrine and the methods and consequences of the colossal spread of its influence on the masses.

Representatives of various social strata took part in the many meetings and events organized in the United States in 1983 to commemorate the Karl Marx Centennial.

On the one hand, statements by active promoters of Marxist-Leninist theory in the United States have always been of great significance. On the other, the celebration also evoked statements from many bourgeois "Marxologists" and petty bourgeois ideologists with either "neo-Marxist" or doctrinaire ultra-leftist leanings. The latter, for example, addressed a conference in New York's Cooper Union Hall in spring 1983.

At the beginning of 1983, some reformist Marxologists and leftist-revisionist "critics" of genuine socialism published articles in which the principles of scientific communism, as substantiated thoroughly by Marx, were arbitrarily--and with no regard for historical facts--interpreted in line with the abstract premises of non-proletarian, "ethical" socialism, and Marx' teachings about the worldwide historic mission of the working class were groundlessly called "utopian" and were replaced with theories designed to vindicate and glorify the role of the lumpenproletariat and petty bourgeois strata in world history.³

In contrast to this, the accuracy and validity of Marx' arguments were firmly and logically defended at many meetings, conferences and symposiums held in various parts of the United States to discuss Marx and his doctrine, and the groundless arguments of his old and new "iconoclasts" were criticized. These gatherings were addressed by representatives of progressive organizations, union activists, scholars, college instructors and university professors.

In the second half of March 1983 a conference on "Karl Marx and the Contemporary Revolutionary Movement" was organized in New York by the Marxist journal POLITICAL AFFAIRS, the philosophical organ of the Communist Party USA, and the Marxist People's School. At the opening session, General Secretary G. Hall of the Communist Party USA presented a report in which he pointedly criticized the Reagan Administration's reactionary policy.

That same month, the American communist leader was invited to speak on Marx' teachings in one of the largest churches in Boston. The texts of both speeches were included in a book published in 1983 by a progressive publishing firm, International Publishers.⁴

The main topics of discussion at the New York conference were the achievements of genuine socialism, various aspects of the improvement of socialist society and the tremendous international significance of the successes of labor in the USSR. Whereas the concept of socialism was being debated by the world labor movement in Marx' lifetime, conference speakers pointed out, in the 20th century, particularly after the Great October Socialist Revolution, these debates have focused on the nature of the society engendered by the triumphant proletarian revolution.

In this connection, they underscored the need for thorough criticism, from a class position and Marxist vantage point, of the bourgeois myths about so-called "pure" democracy (actually interpreted only in the formal, bourgeois-"pluralist" sense) or about "freedom," which is actually seen essentially as the freedom to fight against socialism. Conference speakers stressed the importance of criticism of theories preaching the "Europocentric" opinion that "true" socialism can come into being only in the industrially developed Western countries, or the opposite view (supported, in particular, by P. Sweezy, S. Amin and their colleagues) that real revolutionary changes in society can only come from the periphery of the contemporary capitalist system. Conference speakers, including the representative of the Institute of the International Workers Movement, USSR Academy of Sciences, and renowned American economist V. Perlo, revealed the groundlessness of these views and cogently underscored the colossal international significance of genuine socialism's political and socioeconomic achievements in the struggle against imperialism and for peace and social progress.⁵

Analyzing various aspects of the activity of the present Washington administration, American Marxists noted that the Reagan Administration has been more eager than previous administrations to secure maximum profits for giant U.S. corporations.

The policy of the current administration, which is transferring the tax burden to the shoulders of the working class and other non-monopolistic population strata, is precisely the kind of policy, communists stressed, to which Marx was referring when he said that capital, aided by the state, forces the people to shoulder the burden of expenditures, including non-productive ones, and especially military expenditures. The militarization of the country is not only increasing the danger of nuclear war, but is also exacerbating U.S. economic difficulties.

Conference speakers said that it was the most important function of American Marxists to cite specific examples to illustrate the basic economic law of capitalism, revealing the sources of corporate profits. The monopolistic bourgeoisie wants to intensify the exploitation of labor in the United States and in other parts of the capitalist world. Speakers cited data to prove conclusively that the superexploitation of ethnic minorities is one of the main sources of superprofits. For example, the added value norm in illegally annexed Puerto Rico is three times as high as the U.S. average.

American Marxists assert that the correct interpretation of aspects of the class struggle necessitates a thorough understanding of the objective laws of capitalism. This was correctly pointed out at the same conference by J. Jackson and by other prominent members of the Communist Party USA-- L. Dlugin, J. Tyner, M. Zagarell, D. Steel and L. Diskin.⁶

It must be said that little attention has been paid to problems in the development of American imperialism in the United States during the Karl Marx Centennial. It is no secret that for many years, particularly in the last few, criticism of the idea of "American exceptionalism" has constantly grown stronger. Most of the critics have been Marxists and representatives of the

organized labor movement's left wing. As conference speakers noted with complete justification, the groundlessness of this idea in all of its various forms is constantly being demonstrated by experience.

It is indicative that even some bourgeois ideologists, including renowned economists, sociologists, historians and political scientists, both liberal and neoconservative, had to acknowledge the increasing severity of the crisis of "Americanism" in the past crisis-ridden decade.

What is the reason for this?

One group of American authors, including the "Marxologists," blames it primarily on the weaker foreign policy influence of the United States and on other international factors attesting to the accumulation of conflicts and crises in the world capitalist system in general⁷ at a time of increased influence on the part of genuine socialism, the collapse of colonialism and the crisis of neocolonialism.

Other bourgeois ideologists have concentrated on internal unrest, the "Water-gate syndrome," the subsequent series of scandals in Washington and the growth of the protest movement.

Finally, there are also some researchers who cite convincing arguments, based on an analysis of numerous international and domestic factors, to prove that the decreasing influence of U.S. ruling circles and American monopolies in the world capitalist system is unavoidable. Some of them, particularly at the beginning of the 1970's, began to write about the failure of the "American dream" and the end of the "American era."⁸ "America today," they maintain, "is undergoing the most serious revision of the bases of its foreign policy since the founding of the republic as a result of the flagrant violations of democracy by regimes such as the one in South Korea, combined with the defeat in Vietnam and its adverse effects within the United States." All of this has caused many Americans to doubt the effectiveness of the administration's policy of globalism. The postwar American generation has been increasingly inclined to renounce the basic postulates of American policy in recent decades.⁹

The accumulation of economic difficulties within the United States has heightened the sense of insecurity. American economists have had to acknowledge the increasing severity of the crisis of the capitalist economic mechanism and the accumulation of increasingly serious and incurable ailments in U.S. socio-economic life. This was already being pointed out in the mid-1970's by J. Galbraith, who said it was "not surprising that the neoclassical model has recently lost influence, particularly in the minds of the younger generation of American analysts."¹⁰ Even more pointed statements about the decline of American imperialism are made in a work by University of California Professor M. Castells¹¹ and in several works by E. Wright, J. Streindl, N. Birnbaum, R. Heilbroner and other economists and sociologists who express critical or even radical opinions about the nature of the crisis of imperialism in general and American state-monopoly capitalism in particular.¹²

The growing difficulties encountered by U.S. monopolies as a result of the fundamental social changes in world development have naturally evoked different

reactions in different political and ideological circles. For example, conservative economists and political scientists (G. C. Lodge, D. Moynihan and their colleagues) recall the time when the influence of the chauvinist ideas of "Americanism" was unlimited and regret the fact that changes have made America "lose the conviction that it is moving in the right direction."¹³

The evolution of the ideological platform of the variety of "neoconservatism" propounded by D. Bell aroused considerable interest in various segments of American society. The increasingly pessimistic outlook of this troubadour of "post-industrialism" was reflected in his acknowledgement of several symptoms of glaring contradictions in contemporary capitalism, the loss of American international influence and the crisis of the ideology of "Americanism."

Bell's conclusions were stated in concise form in his article "The End of American Exceptionalism." It originally appeared in THE PUBLIC INTEREST in the middle of the 1970's;¹⁴ later it was reprinted numerous times--with some revisions--and discussed widely in various publications.¹⁵ In this article which seems to represent a policy-planning essay, permeated with neoconservative feelings of pessimism, there is a hint of nostalgia for the "American era," for the old days of unrestricted expansion and "American superiority": After all, its apologists hoped that the class struggle could be "surmounted" and believed that they could impede the growth of the world revolutionary workers and anti-imperialist movement by preaching "Americanism." "Each of socialism's conceptual conclusions is countered by the appropriate conceptual premise in Americanism"--this is a statement from one of the anthologies published in the 1970's with the participation of renowned American sociologists.¹⁶

These dreams, however, did not come true.

Even D. Bell had to admit that "the influence of the concept of American exceptionalism grew perceptibly weaker and dwindled, along with imperial possibilities and faith in the country's future."¹⁷

The struggle against illusions about the "American era" is of serious importance to U.S. progressive forces and, in general, to many Americans who advocate a more realistic and healthy approach to the processes occurring in today's world. The need to give up outdated ideas was mentioned by many speakers at conferences and symposiums held in the United States in 1983 to discuss the implications of Marx' ideas in today's world.¹⁸

Marxists have always been particularly interested in the development of the working class. Theories alleging that the workers do not represent a class occupying a special position in the system of national production and the society have always been criticized by the Communist Party USA. Stressing the increased activity of the working class in various spheres of struggle, party leaders have argued that it is precisely this special position in the system of national production that has made it possible for the working class to play "the key role in the struggle for democracy and against the oppressive practices of monopolies."¹⁹

Adhering to the principles of the scientific, class analysis of social processes, American Communists have devoted considerable attention to the study of changes

in the structure of the proletariat under the influence of the scientific and technical revolution, the analysis of its economic status and the comprehensive investigation of new developments in the mass workers and antimonopoly movement. They have refuted various bourgeois rightist-opportunist and ultraleftist-revisionist distortions of Marx' statements about classes and the class struggle.

Speeches and works by American Marxists on major aspects of U.S. economics, history and politics have aroused the interest of increasingly large segments of the American public by revealing the truth about the development of the new socialist society and about the peaceful policy of the socialist countries. It is no coincidence that prominent American Communists have recently been invited more frequently to present lectures and reports on university campuses, have addressed the most diverse gatherings, including religious ones, and have been interviewed by radio and television journalists.

In one form or another, Marxist ideas have also displayed varying degrees of increased influence among students and instructors. Whereas for many decades (due in particular to the strong influence of beliefs in the "special" nature of U.S. historical development) the majority of American sociologists and historians did not use the terms "class struggle," "proletariat" and so forth, in recent years the situation has begun to change in this respect. Terms borrowed from Marxists have appeared more frequently in works by various authors, despite all of the diversity of their views.

In a discussion of the ideological and political evolution of various bourgeois-liberal and reformist outlooks, V. I. Lenin once wrote about the "reflection of Marxism in bourgeois literature."²⁰ In our day the growing influence of Marxist ideas on the views of some Western, including American, economists, historians and sociologists with liberal-reformist or radical petty bourgeois views is indisputably reflected in the definite advances and changes in their terminology.

For instance, three or four decades ago, American histories of the workers movement were influenced most by the stereotypes of the "Wisconsin" school of economic history, whose founders (J. Commons, S. Perlman and P. Taft) extolled the Gompers tradition and the pragmatic experience of "commercial unionism" and denied the possibility of a rise in the political consciousness of the American proletariat and the intensification of its class struggle.

In the 1950's authors like D. Bell were propounding the thesis that the working class had become an integral part of state-monopoly capitalism and termed this a "state of universal prosperity." In the last decade, however, other schools and currents of historical analysis (including new fields such as "new social history" and "new economic history") gained more influence. Representatives of these currents focused, for example, on the criticism of giant corporations and their policy, trends in the development of state-monopoly tendencies and the intensification of social conflicts under these conditions, on the disclosure of the reasons for the growth of opposition feelings and protest movements in the labor community during different stages of U.S. history and on the analysis of processes affecting the demands, class

awareness and activity of the proletariat and the basic directions and forms of its struggle.

Now that the influence of the idea of "American exceptionalism" is waning, many American sociologists, historians and economists are devoting more attention to the development of social movements, including antimonopoly and antiwar movements.

On the one hand, there has been a rise of interest in the history of the expansion of giant monopolies, in the consequences of their greed and in the analysis of the basic factors opposing their activity in the United States and abroad. On the other hand, the study of U.S. economic and political trends is being coordinated more closely with the analysis of the crises which are developing in the world capitalist system as a whole and are influencing the status and struggle of the masses in various countries. The increased interest in the history of the international workers movement and in the study of this movement at many U.S. universities in recent years is understandable.

During the current stage of the intensification of imperialist conflicts and the growing influence of the world revolutionary process, some bourgeois ideologists, especially bourgeois reformists and leftist radicals, have had to take the increased interest in Marxist ideas, particularly among youth, into account. Analyzing this phenomenon, B. Ollman and E. Vernoff, the editors of a recently published anthology of articles about the influence of Marxist ideas on instructors and researchers in the social sciences, state that the activity of ultra-rightwing, conservative circles in the United States has revitalized the "opponents of Marxism and there have been some signs of a rebirth of McCarthyism." At the same time, they write, in American universities "there has been something like a Marxist cultural revolution. More and more students and instructors are accepting the Marxist interpretation of the workings of capitalism and trends in its development."²¹

The overwhelming majority of researchers cannot deny the "indisputable presence of Marxism in today's world." Here is a characteristic example. American philosopher and economist R. Heilbroner asks: "Why are Marx' works still so appealing after more than a century?" He then replies: "Anyone who wants to continue investigating the paths mapped out by Marx will discover that Marx was far ahead of his time."²²

The intensification of the internal and external conflicts of imperialism has compounded the spiritual, ideological and political crisis of American society. Large segments of the public have been seized by feelings of depression and incontrovertible pessimism. These feelings, which have been reflected in the works of the American establishment's official ideologists since the 1970's, have recently grown perceptibly stronger. "The world must expect a difficult entry into the 21st century," assert the American forecasters who compiled a voluminous report on the world in 2000 for the White House.²³

Other American researchers have had to admit that fewer Americans now believe that their lives will be better in the future. After hoping for automatic progress for a long time, many Americans are experiencing strong doubts about

steady development. The majority no longer accept the "American dream" at face value and many believe that it "has few supporters." Noting that "a society without hope is a sick society" and that many people in the West believe that the complexity of today's problems "could confuse people and turn them into inveterate pessimists," the authors of one work devote special attention to the danger of nuclear war and the need to prevent it.

Many prominent politicians and journalists in the United States and abroad are quite disturbed by the outburst of war hysteria in the United States and the dangerous implications of Washington's overtly militarist line.²⁴

In spite of the efforts of NATO ruling circles to quell the wave of mass anti-war demonstrations, the antinuclear movement has acquired huge dimensions in the Western countries, including America. Increasingly large groups of Americans, including many union officials, are realizing the implications of the nuclear arms race and the possible effect of the outburst of militarism on the common people. The majority supported, for example, the idea of a national march on Washington to demand "jobs, peace and freedom," which was organized by U.S. antiwar, labor and other organizations on 27 August 1983 and had colossal social repercussions.

The position taken by the leadership of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, has aroused considerable interest. After the start of the Reagan Administration, W. Winpisinger, its president, repeatedly criticized the Republicans' economic program and foreign policy objectives. At a national conference of black union members in spring 1981, he was among the initiators of a resolution condemning Washington's escalation of the arms race and requesting the Republican administration to begin negotiating the limitation of strategic nuclear arms with the Soviet Union.

The association condemned the Pentagon's plans for the strategic MX missile on the grounds that these plans are aimed at the attainment of a goal as adventurous as it is illusory--military superiority to the USSR--and will also lay a new burden on American labor. In August 1983 Winpisinger was invited to Moscow by the AUCCTU and the Central Committee of the Trade-Union of Workers in USSR Heavy Machine Building and was received by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Yu. V. Andropov.

On the initiative and with the financial support of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, the Council on Economic Priorities prepared a report entitled "The Costs and Consequences of Reagan's Military Buildup," revealing the pernicious effects of arms race escalation on the U.S. economy. The report concludes that some of the specific negative effects of militarization are the reduced market for civilian goods and the loss of U.S. competitive potential in world markets.²⁵

In fact, the United States ranked first among the 13 most highly developed industrial Western countries in the last decade in terms of proportional military expenditures in the GNP, but it was only in 11th place in terms of GNP growth rates.²⁶

As the report states, data for the last 10 years reflect an absolutely definite trend: Increased military spending is accompanied as a rule by increased unemployment.

In the 1970's, Chase Econometrics conducted an economic analysis of the B-1 strategic bomber program. With the aid of computers, it compared the employment impact of expenditures on the creation of the B-1 bomber to the impact of equivalent expenditures on government-financed housing construction or a tax cut of the same amount. The results indicated that the tax cut and the housing construction program would create 30,000 more jobs and 70,000 more respectively. The Council on Economic Priorities conducted a similar study of the MX program. Using the expenditure-output model, council experts concluded that the use of a billion dollars (in 1980 prices) in such spheres as municipal services, public transport, railway construction or housing construction would secure 38,700, 45,400, 31,800 and 30,900 jobs respectively, while the MX missile would secure only 29,400.²⁷

Nevertheless, government expenditure priorities are being reordered in the federal budget for the sake of the administration's militarist plans. This is reflected above all in the sharp cuts in allocations for social programs and public works.

The militarization of the economy, the more frequent structural and cyclical crises, fluctuations in the economy and the difficulties encountered by American capitalism in the 1980's in general have all had a negative effect on the status of the broad popular masses, especially the working class.

The combination of production cuts and recession with inflation perceptibly lowered the standard of living of U.S. workers. Their real wages in 1982 were 15 percent below the 1972 level. Between 1975 and 1980 the total decrease in the potential purchasing power of the wages (with adjustments for rising prices and taxes) of a production worker in a non-agricultural occupation with three dependents was 7.5 percent lower than the 1972 maximum.²⁸

This has had the most severe impact on groups of hired workers who perform the lowest-paying jobs and encounter the greatest discrimination: non-white Americans, people with little education or skills, youth, women and the elderly. They are the main reason for the growth of the army of millions of workers living below the poverty level (in 1982 their number exceeded 32 million).

Bourgeois ideologists, including the advocates of "American exceptionalism," took so much trouble to prove that exploitation, crises and unemployment had "come to an end" in the West. For many years they used this argument to "refute" the general law of capitalist accumulation formulated by K. Marx and his conclusions about social polarization, about the accumulation of wealth at one pole of bourgeois society and deprivation, poverty and destitution at the other. In fact, however, it was their own ideas, and not Marx', that were refuted. As a Communist Party USA document published just before its 23d congress stresses, Reagan's policy, which is in the interest of corporations, has only aggravated the basic problems encountered by Americans. It has

destroyed the social security system. There are more hungry, homeless and sick people in the country now than at any other time in its history.

This policy has broken all records in lowering the standard of living and making millions of people even more needy. Pointing out the connection between the colossal military budget and the cuts in wages and social programs for workers, the high rate of unemployment and the closure of enterprises in civilian branches, the American Communists state in the documents of their 23d national congress that "the very foundations of the capitalist order are continuing to deteriorate" in the United States and that the general crisis of this order has reached "a new qualitative level."

Consequently, no matter what major spheres of U.S. public life we examine--economic processes, increasingly pronounced social conflicts or the growth of antiwar movements--the facts everywhere testify that in the main, basic features of its development, the United States does not represent an "exception," but provides more and more evidence of the accuracy and viability of Marxism's conclusions about the natural laws and tendencies common to the capitalist world as a whole.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Statement by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Yu. V. Andropov," PRAVDA, 29 September 1983.
2. "Karl Marks i sovremennost'" [Karl Marx and the Present Day], Moscow, 1983, p 7.
3. "The Portable Karl Marx, with an Introduction by Eugene Kamenka," N.Y., 1983, p XLI. Also see: P. Sweezy, "Marxism and Revolution 100 Years After Marx," MONTHLY REVIEW, vol 34, No 10, March 1983, pp 6-11.
4. For a Russian translation of the complete text of this report, see RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYIY MIR, 1983, No 4; also see KOMMUNIST, 1983, No 14.
5. POLITICAL AFFAIRS, 1983, No 4-5, pp 21-22, 40.
6. J. Jackson, "Karl Marx and the United States," N.Y., 1983; also see POLITICAL AFFAIRS, 1983, No 4-5, pp 15-18, 48, 64-80.
7. K. Phillips, "Post-Conservative America: People, Politics and Ideology in a Time of Crisis," N.Y., 1983.
8. See, for example, A. Hacker, "The End of the American Era," N.Y., 1970.
9. T. Osborne and P. Mabbutt, "Paths to the Present: Thoughts on the Contemporary Relevance of America's Past," N.Y., 1974, pp VII-VIII, 54.

10. J. Galbraith, "Economics and the Public Purpose," N.Y., 1977, pp 43-44.
11. M. Castells, "The Economic Crisis and American Society," Oxford, 1980.
12. E. Wright, "Class, Crisis and the State," London, 1978; J. Streindl, "Maturity and Stagnation in American Capitalism," N.Y., 1976; "Beyond the Crisis," edited by N. Birnbaum, N.Y., 1977; R. Heilbroner, "Between Capitalism and Socialism. Essays in Political Economics," N.Y., 1970; Idem, "Business Civilization in Decline"; Idem, "Marxism: For and Against," N.Y., 1980.
13. G. Lodge, "The New American Ideology," N.Y., 1977, pp 335-337.
14. D. Bell, "The End of American Exceptionalism," THE PUBLIC INTEREST, No 41, Fall 1975, pp 193-224.
15. See, for example, PARAMETERS, Journal of the U.S. Army War College, June 1980; THE TOCQUEVILLE REVIEW (Journal of the Tocqueville Society), vol IV, No 2, Fall-Winter 1982.
16. L. Samson, "Americanism as Surrogate Socialism," in "Failure of a Dream?" edited by J. Lasbett and S. Lipset, N.Y., 1974, p 426; also see PARAMETERS, June 1980, p 7.
17. PARAMETERS, June 1980, pp 4, 8.
18. For more detail, see, for example, "Marxism and Social Sciences in the United States," A Paper Delivered at a Marx Centennial Symposium Held in March 1983, at San Jose State University, in California, POLITICAL AFFAIRS, 1983, No 6, pp 18-22.
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MARXISM ON THE INTEGRITY OF THE WORLD ECONOMY. PAST AND PRESENT

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[Article by N. P. Shmelev]

[Text] The U. S. Administration's efforts to escalate international tension, its intention to solve the difficult problems of the present day by means of militarism and force and its arrogant contempt for the interests of the entire world community and of any other country if these interests are contrary to the American view of the world have been making their way from the political sphere to the economic sphere in recent years. It appears that the U. S. Administration is deliberately trying to divide the world economy into hostile centers and groups and to intensify its already merciless and unrestricted struggle against other countries, apparently in the hope of winning this struggle at some time in the future and forcing the world to accept its own terms for future world economic development.

The need to curb Washington's imperial ambitions, to prevent the disintegration of the world economy and to preserve and reinforce the possibility of equal and mutually beneficial international economic cooperation is a vital issue of world economic significance today and concerns the vital interests of all peoples and countries. The problem of securing peaceful coexistence, detente and constructive international cooperation has gone far beyond the framework of relations between states of the two world systems: Today the future of East-West relations and the future of the entire system of international political and economic relations depend on the triumph of these principles.

The World Economy as a Contradictory Entity

At the basis of the Marxist theory of the world economy and world economic relations lies the analysis of the development of productive forces as a process of the increasingly complete and increasingly thorough division of labor, with unlimited possibilities and continuous development in breadth and depth within the boundaries of national economies and on the global scale. On the socioeconomic level, this process is reflected in the constant growth of the societal nature of labor, taking the form of more or less regular acts of exchange during the initial states and the form of genuinely cosmopolitan,

in K. Marx' words, production dimensions,¹ a highly developed system of international specialization and cooperation and the constant growth of requirements and possibilities for the movement of goods, manpower and financial resources across national boundaries during the highest stages. In other words, the collectivization of labor, which has traditionally signified the replacement--within national boundaries--of one social structure by another, more progressive one, with the development of a world market and a world economy and the development of the societal nature of labor (in its international form), establishes the material prerequisites for a more progressive order on the global scale, and not just within national boundaries.

This process underwent intensive development after the transition to machine production had been completed in the leading capitalist countries--that is, at some time in the middle of the 19th century. "The use of machines and steam," K. Marx remarked, "has given division of labor such huge dimensions that large-scale industry has been uprooted from its national soil and already depends exclusively on the world market, on international exchange and on international division of labor."² The world market, international exchange and international economic ties have played, and are still playing, the most active role in the development of mass production as a fundamental condition for its very existence, and not only in relatively small countries, but also in large ones, and today even in the biggest countries. As K. Marx stressed, "the enlargement of the market--that is, the sphere of exchange--increases the dimensions of production and brings about its more pronounced differentiation."³ As productive forces develop, purely commercial economic ties, the material content of which consists of the mutual exchange of finished manufactured goods, are replaced by international ties in the very process of production, relations pertaining to the manufacture of the finished product, from the exchange of resources for resources or resources for finished products to--with the development of international cooperation--the exchange of materials, components and parts for the manufacture of this finished product.

The spread of large-scale industry and mass production throughout the world made the isolated economic life of individual states completely impossible. F. Engels wrote that "large-scale industry has connected all of the world's peoples to one another, has combined all small local markets into a world market, has prepared the soil everywhere for civilization and progress and has led to a situation in which every event in civilized countries influences all other countries."⁴ Autarchy, once the preferable strategy of national economic development, turned into a burdensome and costly policy, justified only by extraordinary and, consequently, essentially temporary or transitory circumstances. Traditional economic nationalism, which once took the form of efforts to maximize national self-sufficiency, is now either impossible or ineffective and unprofitable, and primarily for purely economic reasons. As K. Marx and F. Engels stressed, "the old local and national isolation and self-sufficiency are being replaced by the total interrelation and interdependence of nations."⁵

During the imperialist stage, the process of the global collectivization of production took new forms, connected with the transnational expansion of

industrial and banking monopolies. The process of international collectivization began to develop at a particularly rapid rate after World War II. Today it includes such far-reaching tendencies as the relaxation of customs and administrative restrictions on the movement of production factors across national boundaries, the growth of regional integration tendencies, the expansion of the operational scales of transnational corporations and their transformation into the main driving force of international capitalist exchange, the priority development of intraorganizational commodity turnover in world trade, the increasing dependence of world industrial centers on their energy and raw material periphery, the accelerated transnational interpenetration of the industrial and banking capital of developed capitalist countries, the increasing interdependence of international debtors and creditors and the augmentation of the supranational role of international trade and monetary institutions.

When V. I. Lenin pointed out the tendency toward the economic convergence of nations in the capitalist era, the growing intensity of world economic contacts and the disappearance of national boundaries in economics, technology and science, he stressed that this tendency "is characteristic of the mature form of capitalism approaching its conversion into a socialist society."⁶ The present scales of the internationalization of capitalist production indicate that the internal and even the international material prerequisites for the transition to the highest stage of collectivized labor--the socialist method of production--have appeared and matured in the depths of monopolistic capitalism. During the stage of monopoly capitalism, V. I. Lenin wrote, capitalists are drawn, "against their will and conscious desires, into some kind of new social order marking the transition from totally free competition to total collectivization."⁷

The appearance and development of the socialist world changed the social nature of the world economy considerably. A new economic system took shape within its boundaries--the world socialist economy, developing on different class basis and in accordance with different socioeconomic laws. International relations of a new type were established here--relations of fraternal cooperation, mutual understanding, genuine equality, non-intervention in internal affairs, and mutual advantage. Exploitation, the desire for self-enrichment at the expense of other nations, inequality and the theft of the resources of others disappeared from this sphere of world economic ties. The integration of the CEMA countries acquired a planned, coordinated nature. A socialist mechanism of mutually beneficial international cooperation, based on the combination of plans and commodity and monetary methods of controlling the international movement of production factors, took shape. Marx' prediction that public ownership would lead to "the harmonious national and international coordination of public forms of production"⁸ is coming true.

From the standpoint of social classes, the world economy was never an integral system. Producers located on the most diverse levels of social development and belonging to the most diverse social orders have always coexisted and engaged with one another in exchange in the world market. In today's world economy, just as in any other social phenomenon, what Lenin called "remnants of the past, the foundations of the present and the first traces of the

future"⁹ can be found. In this respect, the world economy represents a dialectical entity of social opposites, whose cooperation is purely of a physical and technical nature and has no class content. At the same time, these producers with their different social nature have something in common: All of them produce goods and all of them own goods seeking public and world recognition through the world market. As K. Marx stressed, "regardless of the production method lying at the basis of the manufacture of products circulated as goods--whether it is a primitive communal economy, production based on slave labor, petty peasant and petty bourgeois production or capitalist production--the nature of the goods does not change."¹⁰

In relation to these producers of goods, the world economy is a kind of super-system reflecting current labor productivity levels in the world and corresponding production costs, the global proportions of reproduction, the leading fields and main achievements of world scientific and technical progress and the additions and alternatives to national production represented by international cooperation. Within the framework of the world economy, both the world capitalist economy and the world socialist economy are developing in accordance with objective economic laws pertaining to each specific method of production (and only to it). Exchange between countries with differing social structures or between their economic representatives is still exchange between the owners of goods, who are totally sovereign in relation to one another and are united only by the commercial nature of their interaction. "The law of value," Soviet researcher E. Pletnev writes, "serves as the basis for the combination of the two world economic systems in a single metasystem--the contemporary world economy."¹¹

Of course, basic trends in world economic exchange are still influenced primarily by the objective laws of the capitalist method of production. Nevertheless, the socialist world is also exerting a profound and growing influence on world economic processes: The progressive, democratic principles of international cooperation are transcending the bounds of the world socialist economy, are penetrating other spheres of international life and are whittling away at imperialism's positions. Today the socialist world cannot determine the nature of international economic relations, but the present content of world economic ties and the prospects for their development cannot be interpreted correctly without consideration for all that the socialist world has added to international economic life. The integrity of the world economy is no longer determined by the superiority of any one economic system.

Marxism has always associated social progress with the effects of objective factors inherent in productive forces and has always resolutely opposed the forcible inhibition of their objective development, particularly in the sphere of world economic relations. The current processes of the internationalization of economic affairs in the capitalist world, with all of their contradictions, conflicts and struggle, are an unavoidable reality, the slow and agonizing maturation of physical and technical, and even social, conditions for the further progress of mankind, the prospects of which were outlined by the founders of Marxism. In reference to the choice between protectionism and free trade, K. Marx commented: "We believe in free trade,

because its institution will mean that all economic laws with their gaping contradictions will operate in a much broader sphere, throughout a much larger territory, the territory of the entire world; and because the inter-meshing of all these contradictions wherever they clash will give rise to a struggle, and this struggle will end with the liberation of the proletariat." The freedom of trade, he wrote at another time, "will exacerbate the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie to the extreme. In short, the system of free trade will accelerate the social revolution."¹²

The Socialist World and the World Economy

In the West the socialist countries are often accused of, on the one hand, supposedly adhering to autarchic theories of development and, on the other, supposedly having an interest in worldwide economic chaos, the escalation of world economic crises and the subversion of existing international trade and monetary institutions. It is not only the most extreme groups, trying to depict the socialist world as the main "source of evil" in today's world, but also more moderate rightwingers, such as, for example, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State A. Sonnenfeldt, who alleged that if the USSR and its allies really do want to take an active part in international economic cooperation, "they must realize that they will have to play by the rules of the international economic system."¹³

Statements about the socialist countries' alleged desire for autarchy reflect not only political hatred for socialism, but also the generally anti-historical nature of bourgeois thinking and its inability to separate objective trends in social development from temporary circumstances. The policy of peaceful coexistence and constructive international cooperation is organically inherent in socialism as a social system. At the very dawn of Soviet rule, V. I. Lenin stressed that "under socialism the laboring masses will not consent to any kind of isolation for purely economic...reasons."¹⁴ It is not our fault that imperialism greeted the young Soviet Republic with armed intervention and the most rigid economic blockade. When normal relations began to be established little by little with the capitalist countries in the second half of the 1920's and the early 1930's, the Soviet Union immediately became much more active in international economic exchange, and foreign trade began to play an extremely important role in the fulfillment of plans for the industrialization of the country, particularly during the period of the first two five-year plans. At the end of the 1930's, however, the approach of war forced the Soviet Union to concentrate on maximum self-sufficiency in its economic policy, and this not only created more favorable economic conditions for our victory in the Great Patriotic War, but also made our country economically invulnerable during the period of "cold war," when the USSR and its allies were virtually subjected once again to an economic blockade by imperialism. As soon as the international political atmosphere began to be renormalized in the 1970's, the Soviet Union again participated much more actively in world economics and international commodity exchange. Today the degree of involvement of the Soviet national economy in international economic exchange, judging by the proportion accounted for by exports in the national product, is at least comparable to similar indicators for the United States, which was not subjected to any kind of blockades during the postwar period.

How can there be any talk of an interest in chaos or a refusal to "play by the rules"? It is true that Marxism has always had definite and precise views on the insoluble contradictions of capitalism, which are characteristic of the national economies of individual capitalist countries and of the world capitalist economy as a whole. K. Marx wrote: "All of the destructive phenomena resulting from free competition within each individual country are reproduced in the world market on an even larger scale."¹⁵ But these views have not been expressed with malice, but with class solidarity with the laboring masses in the capitalist countries because they have had to shoulder the burden of the contradictions of the capitalist system and its major and minor economic crises. Furthermore, the participation of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in international economic life has alleviated the consequences of these crises more than once by taking the edge off mass unemployment and increasing the load of production capacities in the capitalist countries. In this connection, it is significant that in 1931, at the height of a world economic crisis, Soviet purchases accounted for one-third of all world exports of machines and equipment, and in 1932 they accounted for around half of the total. During the period of detente, particularly during the crisis of 1974-1975 in the West, the orders placed by socialist countries provided more than 2 million people there with jobs. Extensive mutual contacts also played an important role, particularly for the countries of Western Europe, during the economic crisis of the early 1980's by securing the maintenance and survival of several industries in these countries at a time of economic depression.¹⁶

The Soviet Union is known in international business circles not as a country refusing to "play by the rules," but as a strict observer of these rules, including the contractual basis of stable commercial relations, the guarantee of negotiated purchases and deliveries, the use of only internationally recognized methods of competition and the unconditional fulfillment of financial obligations in full and on schedule. The USSR has never resorted to any kind of trade bans or embargoes, has never used normal commercial relations as an instrument of political pressure and has not tried to gain unilateral advantages in economic cooperation at the expense of the legitimate interests of its partners.

The constructive role of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in world economics has been reflected in many important ways. We must not forget, for example, that the USSR was one of the countries responsible for the 1944 Bretton Woods program for the reorganization of international trade and monetary relations, and that Washington's excessive imperial ambitions were the only reasons for the Soviet refusal to participate in the agreement. At the beginning of the 1950's the USSR initiated a new phenomenon in international economic relations--regular aid to the Asian, African and Latin American countries for purposes of development. There is also no doubt that the major advances in economic relations between the developing countries and the West, which took place in 1973-1974 and marked the beginning of the movement for a new world economic order (we should recall H. Kissinger's ill-reputed threat to solve the oil crisis by force), would have been impossible without the support of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Mutually beneficial cooperation throughout Europe also acquired its present

scales as a result of the active, or even decisive, efforts of the USSR and other socialist countries. The list of these examples could go on.

Stressing the mutually advantageous role of normal commercial relations between the world's first socialist state and its capitalist partners, Lenin said that "we represent...the builders of a world economy."¹⁷ Socialism is not interested in chaos, but in the steady and consistent development of international economic cooperation for the good of all its participants.

The world economy, in which capitalist relations still prevail, cannot develop without crises. Responsible international behavior, however, can alleviate them and make them less severe, and their unhealthy effects on the status of the laboring masses in all parts of the world have been reduced perceptibly. The elimination of all forms of discrimination from international economic relations, the establishment of a mutually acceptable price structure (primarily related prices for energy resources and manufactured goods), the stabilization of markets and sources of vitally important products, the reduction of protectionism, the augmentation of international aid to developing countries, particularly by means of cuts in military spending, the resolution of the now worldwide problem of debts, and the reconstruction of international commercial and monetary relations on a fair and democratic basis would be fully in the interests of participants in world economics.

"Our goal is not simply the prevention of war," Yu. V. Andropov stressed in his speech at the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. "We are striving for fundamental improvements in international relations and the consolidation and development of all positive elements of these relations.... In our era it is precisely socialism that represents the most consistent defender of healthy elements of international relations, a defender of the interests of detente and peace and the interests of each nation and all mankind."¹⁸

United States and Its Rivals: Conflict of Interest

Verbally, the Reagan Administration stands for the maximum freedom of trade and other forms of world economic relations, the completely unrestricted play of market forces and the removal of all obstacles impeding the free movement of production factors across national boundaries. In reality, however, this widely publicized position is contrary to the actual content of American policy in international affairs.

In the first place, the classic policy of the free play of market forces is essentially a previous stage in the development of capitalism, which has now reached the higher stage of international collectivization of labor. Contemporary world economic ties objectively need some international regulation, or what is called direction in the West. The possible and necessary degree of this direction is another matter, and here we probably have to agree with the group of American government experts who feel that "the appropriate role of government, free enterprise and supranational structures will be the focus of international debates in the 1980's and 1990's and will have indisputably far-reaching political implications for all countries."¹⁹ One thing is obvious: There is virtually no major economic problem of

worldwide significance that can be solved today without international regulation, whether it is the energy crisis, the problem of reorganizing the now "irrational structure" of international economic relations,²⁰ or the problem of the debts of developing countries, which could, if it remains unsolved, "submerge the world in an economic crisis for a decade or longer."²¹

The issue now is not the specific ways in which problems can be solved--for example, whether the problem of international liquidity should be solved by writing off a substantial proportion of the debt, as many developing countries are demanding, by the extension of new loans or the refinancing of old ones through the united efforts of "four countries (this apparently means the United States, the FRG, England and Japan--N. Sh.) ten American banks and the Federal Reserve System," by the conversion of the debts of developing countries into IBRD bonds²² or by some other method. The fact is that the very resolution of a problem of these dimensions is only possible through international cooperation: As former Chancellor H. Schmidt of the FRG remarked, "we can no longer afford to trust the invisible hand of the market. The market's 'self-restorative' powers cannot be the answer to all our problems."²³

The Reagan Administration, however, has actually rejected all serious attempts at the joint resolution of major world economic problems concerning the interests of all nations in its race for world hegemony and for the forcible establishment of a "Pax Americana." This happened in Cancun when the heads of state and government of 8 developed capitalist countries and 14 developing states met within the framework of the North-South dialogue, it happened in Versailles and it happened the last time the leaders of the 7 main Western powers met in Williamsburg. According to the 11 May 1983 issue of the NEW YORK TIMES, today the actual "U. S. position consists in avoiding any international plan of action for secured economic growth." In essence, this has also been acknowledged by M. Feldstein, the chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers: "A program of joint economic efforts is actually inapplicable to the situation in the United States."²⁴

In the second place, although the American leadership has loudly condemned protectionism, discrimination and all other methods of forcible intervention in international economic relations, it has made every effort in recent years to complicate the life of the entire world community--of its allies among the leading capitalist powers, of developing countries and of socialist states--by arbitrary and purely political means. This glaring contradiction between words and actions was pointed out by prominent American economist R. Vernon, who remarked that U.S. policy has actually always displayed a tendency "to depart from the principles of free trade in specific, individual cases."²⁵ It was precisely the United States that began the new series of protectionist measures in recent years by taking rigid administrative, and not economic, actions against its chief rivals in such fields as, for example, the steel, textile and automotive industries and agriculture. After allowing itself to lag behind in the growth rates of labor productivity in industry, after losing its competitive potential in many traditional fields making up the main portion of the American economy,²⁶ after experiencing constantly increasing pressure from West European and Japanese producers in the domestic market, after these foreign producers had made a significant effort to modernize

traditional sectors and develop new ones in the 1970's, the United States tried to protect its inefficient industries with administrative barriers, with no concern for the interests of others. In particular, this applied to ferrous metallurgy, an industry in which effectiveness is already, according to American estimates, a minimum of 10 percent below the Japanese level.²⁷

At the same time, some American groups have complained to the entire world about the subsidized exports of other countries, as if the United States itself had never resorted, and would never resort, to anything of the kind. The regular subsidization of U.S. exports of petrochemical and synthetic textile products are just one example of this. The complaints of American exporters are not justifiable in the case of agricultural exports either: The important thing in the final analysis is not the form the subsidy takes, but the very fact of its existence. American farmers now receive an average of 7,330 dollars a year in some form of government subsidization, as compared to an average of 4,780 dollars in the EEC countries.²⁸ These subsidies heighten the competitive potential of American agricultural exports. "The system of protectionism," K. Marx wrote, "arms the capital of one country for a struggle against the capital of other countries, it strengthens it for a struggle against foreign capital."²⁹ After giving up around one-quarter of its total sales market to its rivals in the 1970's alone, the United States is now trying to use various power tactics to regain its lost position.

The Reagan Administration's financial policy occupies an important place in the arsenal of weapons for this struggle. For several years the monstrous U. S. federal budget deficit, resulting primarily from the dramatic increase in military spending and approaching 210 billion dollars, has motivated the American Administration to engage in unhealthy activity in domestic credit markets, where the government already accounts for more than 70 percent of all loans.³⁰ In turn, this led to an unprecedented rise in interest rates in the U. S. credit market, and these rates are still quite high. This situation, which guarantees foreign depositors in American banks an additional real profit (of 2-7 percent) in comparison to what they receive in their own countries, acts, according to Soviet economist M. A. Portnoy, "like a powerful financial pump transferring money from other countries to the United States."³¹ Without going into the domestic results of this policy, we can say that it is something like outright robbery in relation to the outside world. And no matter how much the United States' allies have complained about the adverse effects of this policy, they have gained nothing from the Reagan Administration, particularly at the meeting in Williamsburg, but vague promises to correct this obviously abnormal situation at some indefinite time in the future.

It should be stressed that it is a tradition in American foreign economic policy to solve U. S. problems at the expense of others. For example, in the 1960's there was the offensive on world markets by the actually unsecured dollar. This evoked the justifiable indignation of the French Government and an equally negative reaction on the part of many experts who believed that the United States was thereby appropriating an inordinately large share of world wealth. As well-known French economist J. Rueff wrote at that time, the American currency gained the exceptional privilege of overseas demand,

and this did not cost the United States anything. "Its balance of payments could have remained negative forever because events transpired as if there were no deficit at all."³² Years later, a similar opinion of the dollar's expansion, especially in Western Europe, was voiced by renowned American specialist R. Triffin: "The United States did not reduce its deficits and the accumulation of its debts to foreign central and commercial banks eventually gave rise to the gold and dollar crisis, culminating--but not coming to an end--in 1971, when the convertibility of the dollar was denied and the Bretton Woods system collapsed."³³ The United States actually became the biggest debtor in the world: In addition to what might be called the "normal" U. S. foreign debt, measured in hundreds of billions of dollars, U. S. currency accounted for more than 70 percent of the overall volume of 1.5 trillion dollars in the Eurocurrency market in 1981.³⁴ It is quite logical to wonder about the chaos that would reign in the world economy if all of these dollars were to be flung onto the U. S. domestic market one fine day as a result of a general panic and if the demand were that these dollars be exchanged for something of more tangible value.

Incidentally, the Eurocurrency market, where interest rates are closely related to rates in the U. S. money market, has become another channel for the transfer of money to the United States from rival countries. Another way in which Washington's chief allies are being bled dry is the high exchange rate of the dollar in connection with the high interest rates in the United States (according to some Western economists, the exchange rate is at least 20 percent above the dollar's actual purchasing power).³⁵ This has dramatically increased the actual cost of all dollar, particularly petrodollar, expenditures by these countries.

The Reagan Administration's selfish and irresponsible policy "has brought about something equivalent in its consequences to a third oil crisis in the industrial (capitalist--N. Sh.) countries."³⁶ According to some estimates, the reduction of U. S. interest rates by 2 points, along with a reduction of the federal budget deficit by half, could accelerate current economic growth rates by 2.5-3 points in the FRG, 1.5-2 in Canada, Italy and Japan and 0.5-1 in France and England. But it is precisely this that the United States' partners have tried and failed to obtain from Washington for several years.

Finally, the problem of international liquidity, which has recently grown perceptibly more acute, and the dangerously high level of indebtedness of the developing countries³⁷ are also largely the result of the artificial rise in U. S. interest rates and the dollar exchange rates. Both of these factors have considerably complicated the repayment of debts and the acquisition of new loans in international financial markets. By the end of 1982 the developing countries owed 626 billion dollars, and loans at high interest rates represent three-fourths of this sum.³⁸

Economic War Against the Socialist World

The U. S. attempts to organize another economic blockade of the Soviet Union and the majority of other socialist countries are a particularly indicative feature of the current U. S. Administration's behavior in international

affairs. Neither the failure of all attempted embargoes in the past, nor the pointedly negative attitude of American business circles toward this policy nor, finally, the stubborn resistance of the NATO allies, for whom trade with the East is important, and is even of vital importance in some fields, could cause the Reagan Administration to diverge from its adventuristic efforts to undermine traditional, mutually beneficial relations between states with differing social orders, the relations on which the policy of peaceful co-existence is based.

There is no need to list all of the many actions of this kind that have been taken in the last 3 years. We will cite just one of the latest--the projected revision of U. S. trade legislation for the purpose of the extraterritorial extension of American sanctions to foreign firms and branches of American companies abroad if they should violate any ban imposed by the U. S. Administration. At least three features of Washington's current policy on economic cooperation with the East appear quite significant.

The first is the American Administration's use of purely political, power tactics to interfere in normal economic processes--that is, the refusal to play by the very "rules" it is supposedly so eager to uphold, and the use of dishonest and unscrupulous methods of competition. The failure of the attempts to subvert the construction of the gasline from West Siberia to Western Europe is one example of the bankruptcy of this policy.

The second is the United States' continued efforts to attain its own goals at the expense of others, including its main competitors--Western Europe and Japan--which account for almost 90 percent of all East-West trade and approximately the same percentage of the credit extended for its development. Just the FRG's trade with the East has more than quadrupled the volume of U. S. trade with the East. It does not take any special economic acumen to understand why even the most faithful allies object to the embargo policy today: If they were to follow Washington's example, this would lead to tremendous economic losses, and primarily for them, and not for the United States. In addition to military and political problems, it is this indifference of the Reagan Administration, its reluctance to consider the legitimate interests of its allies, that lie at the basis of the present complications and difficulties in U. S. relations with Western Europe. As renowned American diplomat T. Buchanan remarked, "the impression that America has ceased to seek possibilities for mutual accommodation represents the core of the current crisis in its relations with its allies and with the Soviet Union."

The third feature is the amazing self-confidence of the U. S. Administration, and it is particularly amazing in combination with its obvious lack of awareness of the actual state of affairs. Could anyone in the Washington leadership seriously believe that the refusal to deliver new American technology could bring about any fundamental changes in the economic, scientific and technical development of a country like the Soviet Union, which has made significant scientific and technical progress, or of an integrated association of such huge dimensions as CEMA? A report of the Office of Technology Assessment of the U. S. Congress said: "It would be difficult to cite

examples of Western equipment which the USSR would be unable to design and develop, although perhaps only after some delay."⁴⁰ According to American estimates, for example, state-of-the-art products represented only 10 percent of all exports from OECD countries to CEMA countries in 1980, goods of average technological standards accounted for 45 percent of the total, and the remaining 45 percent consisted of products not categorized as highly developed technology, including agricultural equipment.⁴¹ Furthermore, the U. S. share of the 10 percent of total exports representing technologically advanced products was less than one-tenth, or less than 1 percent of the total.

This means not only that the USSR's interest in importing American technology is being exaggerated, but also that the U. S. role in international technological exchange is being consciously or unconsciously overestimated. Unfortunately, the American Administration did not learn much from the failure of the "grain embargo." It is probable, however, that the WALL STREET JOURNAL was not far from the truth when it reported: "When we are compared to other countries, we are something like a huge elephant surrounded by deer, but we look more like a flea on the elephant's foot if the elephant represents international trade. We can suggest, but not command."⁴² The American Administration does not have any effective way of stopping normal, mutually beneficial contacts between East and West. The sooner Washington learns this fact, the better it will be for everyone concerned.

We should recall that V. I. Lenin once said: "There is a force greater than the desires, wishes and determination of any hostile government or class--the force of world economic relations."⁴³ Politics can deform world economic ties temporarily, slow down their development and change their direction, but in the final analysis objective economic necessity, as experience has shown, will invariably make its way through the most complex conglomerations of political obstacles. This was the case in the first years after the October Revolution, when the West had to lift the economic blockade of the Soviet Union, and it was the case in the early 1970's, when the postwar embargo policy failed and was replaced by the perceptible revitalization of economic contacts between the states of the two social systems.

Attempts to disintegrate the world economy, to isolate a country or group of countries and to smother their economies have been made more than once in history, from the time of England's "continental blockade" of Napoleon's France to our day. The outcome of these attempts is no secret: No one has ever been able to go against the objective current of world history, against the objective requirements of production and international exchange, for long. There is no doubt that the attempts made at the beginning of the 1980's to revive the policy of economic war against the socialist countries and to achieve their international economic isolation will also fail eventually.

FOOTNOTES

1. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 25, pt I, p 364.
2. Ibid., vol 4, p 157.

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23. THE ECONOMIST, 4 March 1983, p 21.
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25. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, December 1982, p 483.
26. High technology now accounts for 7 percent of the American GNP, but according to estimates the figure will be 10 percent by 1993 (INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS WEEK, 28 March 1983, p 52).

27. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 10 January 1983, p 44.
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36. L'EXPRESS, 25 February 1983, p 20.
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38. TIME, 10 January 1983, p 6.
39. THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY QUARTERLY, Fall 1982, p 210.
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CAUSES OF U.S.-FRG TENSION REMAIN DESPITE KOHL ELECTION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 83
(signed to press 23 Nov 83) pp 25-36

[Article by A. A. Trynkov: "U.S.-FRG Relations: 'New Beginning'"]

[Text] There was a change of government in the FRG just over a year ago. The SPD-FDP coalition disintegrated and a new coalition was formed by the conservative CDU/CSU bloc and the liberal FDP. The previous coalition's 13 years of rule were distinguished by relatively consistent efforts to pursue the new Eastern policy which was announced by SPD and FDP leaders and which made a definite contribution to the relaxation of international tension. Although the CDU/CSU-FDP Government has announced the continuity of this policy on the East, it is trying to give new momentum to FRG policy on the West. Chancellor H. Kohl has displayed heightened foreign policy activity by maintaining frequent contacts with his allies on both sides of the Atlantic. The Bonn leadership is aspiring more openly than before to the role of leader of Western Europe, for the more effective defense of its own interests against the United States from this position.

During his first visit to Washington as chancellor of the FRG in fall 1982, H. Kohl announced a "new beginning" of particularly intense American-West German cooperation "in the spirit of partnership and equality."¹ In this way, the chancellor indirectly admitted that the state of these relations was far from the ideal. After H. Kohl announced his intention to continue the previous government's policy on the East and his reluctance to "follow American orders,"² many observers began to wonder if Bonn was considering a new Western policy and if there would be changes in the FRG's approach in relations with the United States.

These changes were discussed even earlier on the Rhine. In a KOLNER STADTANZEIGER interview in August 1980, former Chancellor H. Schmidt remarked: "Relations between the United States and the FRG today are not the same as they were 15 or 20 years ago. Then we were a dependent client, and today we are an important partner of the United States in many respects,

in very many. Now that we have become more important we cannot regard everything the United States deems expedient to be absolutely correct.... Both states must get used to...treating one another as equal partners."

Therefore, the movement toward a "new beginning" in relations with the United States, of which the present chancellor spoke, is not an exception to the rule observed by the previous West German Government: the maintenance and reinforcement of close ties with the overseas ally, but with an emphasis on the principle of equality. This item has always been on Bonn's agenda because each government on the Rhine has inherited certain conflicts in its relations with Washington, which have acquired something of a permanent nature. In connection with this, H. Kohl's appeal for a "new beginning" seems like another attempt to camouflage existing disagreements with the United States and simultaneously put the blame for their existence on its predecessors, former Chancellors W. Brandt and H. Schmidt, whose Eastern policy expanded the framework of the FRG's alliance with the United States, which had restricted West German foreign policy initiatives, and gave Bonn more room to maneuver.

The 1970's were a real new beginning of relatively equal partnership in American-West German relations. Washington tried to give the partnership a "mature" nature by transferring some of the burden of U.S. military, economic and other obligations to the FRG. Even Bonn's relative independence, however, was a cause of U.S. discontent. According to former national security adviser R. Allen, "the Eastern policy contributed to the birth of many disagreements within the alliance."³

At the start of the Reagan Administration, Washington tried to exclude the process of detente from international relations. The United States resolved to become militarily superior to the USSR and to curtail economic contacts with the USSR on pretexts having nothing to do with the East-West dialogue--events in various countries (in Afghanistan and Poland, for example) or the "crisis situations" in Nicaragua and El Salvador. The "crisis strategy" and "linkage" tactic characteristic of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy line are not only a means of undermining the socialist camp and extending American influence to "Third World" countries, but also a method of intensifying U.S. control over the allies. The West German leaders were criticized in Washington at the beginning of the 1980's for their "disregard of Western policy," the nature of their relations with the USSR, their "desire for neutrality" and the absence of active opposition to the movement against the deployment of new American medium-range missiles in the FRG.

The Schmidt Government did not want Bonn's prestige to decline in the socialist and developing countries and tried to make known its own views, which differed considerably from the American approach to the events in Poland, Central America, the Middle East, etc. It ignored Washington's appeals to boycott the "gas for pipes" project, did not support the institution of rigid economic sanctions against Poland after martial law was declared in this country on 13 December 1981, objected to the tactic of linking the continuation of the all-Europe conference in Madrid with developments in Poland, etc. When H. Schmidt was in the United States in July 1982 and addressed Texan industrialists and politicians in Houston, he advocated a more moderate line, stressing that "confrontation is no way to strengthen the peace."

The line of constructive cooperation with the USSR displeased the White House. As the election campaign in the FRG gathered momentum at the end of 1982 and the beginning of 1983, the American press began to report that R. Reagan, C. Weinberger and other members of the American Administration would like to see a change of government in Bonn. The NEW YORK TIMES frankly stated that H. Kohl "is one of the most pro-American politicians in his conservative party."⁴ Bonn opposition leaders F. J. Strauss and H. Kohl joined the Americans in accusing the SPD leadership of "neutralizing" the FRG and of pursuing a line of "equidistance" between Moscow and Washington.⁵

On the Potomac the response to Kohl's victory was enthusiastic. "His triumph," as former National Security adviser R. Allen termed it, created "favorable conditions for the improvement of Atlantic relations."⁶

Can the change of government in Bonn eliminate American-West German differences of opinion? This seems quite doubtful.

In the first place, Bonn and Washington still have different views on international detente. The present American Administration feels it is nothing other than a mistake by previous governments, and that the entire decade of the 1970's was a period of the decline of American strength and the loss of U.S. prestige.⁷ It unequivocally associates the FRG's Eastern policy with detente, and Washington demanded the "fundamental revision" of this policy immediately after the change of government in Bonn in fall 1982.

In his policy statements of 13 October 1982 and 5 May 1983, H. Kohl carefully avoided any mention of detente. His vice chancellor, Minister of Foreign Affairs H. D. Genscher, is inclined to qualify the word "detente" with the definitions "real," "genuine," "true" or "actual," investing these terms with a specific meaning connected with the West German variety of the "linkage" policy. The idea of "true detente" often conceals Bonn's old revanchist ambitions of the cold war era, now camouflaged under talk about "a new solution to the problems of Germany and Berlin." West German Minister of the Interior F. Zimmermann (CSU) believes that detente cannot last unless it solves "the problems of Germans driven out of their homeland in the East."

At the same time, apparently with a view to the popularity of detente among West Germans (according to DER SPIEGEL, 85 percent of the FRG population supports it)⁸ and to the fact that it promoted the growth of the FRG's international importance in world and European politics, the leaders of the new coalition in Bonn have had to announce the continuity of the Eastern policy, the policy of detente, which affected millions of people in the FRG. "We want disarmament and detente,"⁹ Chancellor Kohl said in his first WASHINGTON POST interview after the March elections to the Bundestag.

To some degree, this desire was expressed when H. Kohl and H. D. Genscher visited Moscow in July 1983. Just before the visit, Ronald Reagan sent the chancellor a letter, expressing the hope that this trip would be "an important aspect of our common strategy." In the talks in Moscow, however, H. Kohl placed greater emphasis on FRG national interests than on these "common" goals. He said that his government "is fully determined" to lay the

"foundations for long-term cooperation and detente."¹⁰ It is this, as H. D. Genscher stressed earlier, that is "in the national interest of the Germans."¹¹

Therefore, Washington cannot expect Bonn's foreign policy line to change radically in the direction desired by the United States--"away from detente"--although this line has displayed some new points of emphasis and nuances reflecting the feelings of West German and American conservative circles.

In the second place, the United States and the FRG have different approaches to relations with the USSR. The Reagan Administration has embarked on a policy of confrontation in all areas. The West German leaders reacted with caution to the American appeals for limited contacts with the USSR. In a policy statement of 5 May 1983, the FRG chancellor advocated the "qualitative improvement of relations with the Soviet Union." Kohl reaffirmed his government's intentions on 4 July in the Kremlin, when he said that Bonn attached "particularly great significance" to relations with the USSR and that "various possibilities exist in the spheres of politics, economics and culture"¹² for the development of cooperation.

In the third place, now that the SPD leaders are in the opposition, they are more open in their criticism of the Reagan Administration's line of confrontation with the socialist countries, and this certainly will not help to alleviate American-West German differences. Bundestag SPD faction foreign policy expert K. Voigt believes that compliance with U.S. demand could endanger the FRG's international prestige. Many members of the SPD agree that regression to "primitive Americanism" would turn the FRG into a spineless satellite of the United States, as a result of which the decisive elements of its foreign policy would be, as V. Borm, a former FDP leader who then transferred its affiliation to the SPD, terms it, "blind vassal loyalty instead of equal partnership."¹³ The West German Social Democrats also proposed a "new strategy" for NATO, for the purpose of "continuing and intensifying detente, to which there is no alternative."¹⁴

Washington should be just as worried by the views of another member of the present coalition in Bonn--the FDP, which is part of the present FRG Government. In its June 1983 Wiesbaden statement on the policy of peace, this party agreed with those who believe that "no one will benefit more than the German people from progress in the area of detente, cooperation and disarmament."

The "green" party, which was swept into the Bundestag for the first time by the wave of strong antimissile feelings, is the center of a broad pacifist opposition which now represents a tangible factor in FRG domestic politics and which must be taken into consideration by both Bonn and Washington.

As DIE WELT reported, the changes in Bonn "simply removed the surface tension from relations with the United States, without eliminating its deep-seated causes."¹⁵

The Cardinal Issue

According to some political observers, by making such frequent statements about "friendship and solidarity" with the United States, H. Kohl is trying to compensate for the dramatic growth of FRG public protests against the projected deployment of American medium-range missiles (according to a NATO decision of 12 December 1979, 108 Pershing-2 missiles and 96 land-based cruise missiles were to be installed in West Germany in 1983). The fact is that Washington attaches primary significance to the FRG's position on missile deployment in the belief that its example will be followed by other West European states.¹⁶ In connection with this, U.S. leaders have been oversensitive to the antimissile movement in the FRG, viewing it as one of the most graphic displays of anti-Americanism in Western Europe. For the West Germans, this is the most vital of issues.

On his pre-election overseas trip last November, H. Kohl tried to assure the American President that he would seek a mandate for the deployment of missiles in the FRG in the elections to the Bundestag. Can we believe that when Kohl won the Bundestag elections on 6 March 1983, he received this mandate and that Washington can count on the support of the West Germans?

According to public opinion polls, 76 percent of the FRG population opposes NATO's sinister plans. Nevertheless, just as the previous Bonn government, the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition supports the idea of so-called "rearming."

Whereas members of the previous cabinet from the SPD are now trying to justify their earlier views by stating that their consent to the deployment of missiles in the FRG was conditional upon Washington's promise to ratify the SALT II treaty, the present West German leaders support the NATO decision and the U.S. position unconditionally. The prevailing opinion in Bonn today is that the Euromissiles are supposedly necessary for the restoration of the balance in medium-range weapons, the absence of which allegedly caused the West European allies to lose faith in Washington.

As for Washington's official position, it regards "rearming" as a possible way of strengthening its influence in Western Europe and is concentrating more on this project than on efforts to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union. According to SPD leader E. Eppler, "the U.S. Administration is more interested in deploying its own missiles than in liquidating Soviet ones, as they pose no threat to America."

The dangerous tendency toward the "Europeanization" of the nuclear risk was already being pointed out by H. Schmidt when he was chancellor--by the irony of fate he was also one of the initiators of NATO's "double decision." By 1980 he was already more inclined to support the particular part of this decision which envisaged negotiation with the Soviet side and to support a moratorium on the deployment of missiles. After the SPD was defeated in the March 1983 elections, primarily because the voters could not discern the Social Democrats' actual position on the missiles (while advocating a policy which would make the deployment of missiles unnecessary, the party leadership nevertheless did not deny the need for "rearming"), this party's policy

displayed a tendency toward the rejection of the "automatic" deployment of missiles in favor of a moratorium and negotiation. E. Barr, a prominent figure in the SPD and an expert on disarmament, proposed that nuclear missiles not be deployed in non-nuclear states or that the deployment of the American missiles be postponed for a year, to give the Geneva talks more time.¹⁷ Chairman W. Brandt of the SPD supported Greece's proposal that the deployment of Euromissiles be postponed for half a year. Another party leader, O. Lafontaine, believes that now that the FRG has "opposed" the United States in matters regarding the delivery of nuclear technology to Brazil, the sanctions against Poland and the "gas for pipes" agreement with the USSR, the time has come to take a firm stand on the deployment of American medium-range missiles as well: "The deployment of the missiles will not be in the German interests. The FRG already has the highest missile density, and new missiles will turn it into a battlefield," he said.¹⁸

The Free Democrats, the coalition partners of the CDU/CSU, demand that "re-armament be made superfluous if possible" in their Wiesbaden statement. Even members of the extremely conservative CSU would like to make their consent to the deployment of missiles conditional upon the acquisition of a "second key": the right to veto any decision to use them.¹⁹

These attitudes must be taken into account by the West German chancellor. Although he himself believes that the deployment of American missiles in the FRG is supposedly "the only way of forcing the Soviet Union to reduce its arsenal," he nevertheless asked the U.S. President to be more flexible in the Geneva talks.²⁰ Kohl told the American President this in April 1983. Washington sympathized with his idea of an "interim" agreement, but essentially has not given up its defense of the "zero option."

According to some observers, H. Kohl hoped to "motivate Washington to submit serious proposals to Moscow with his show of new friendship with the United States" and even began to consider the rejection of the Pershing-2 deployment plan. The chancellor's remarks in his WASHINGTON POST interview of 21 July 1983, that Bonn "has its own opinion" with regard to deployment and that people there feel concessions will be necessary for the sake of an "interim" agreement, irritated Washington, according to reports in the West German press, and caused it to doubt the loyalty of the new FRG Government.²¹ When H. Kohl and H. D. Genscher announced the possibility of a compromise in Geneva,²² it was made clear to them that they might be alone in this decision.

People in Washington were apparently aware of the need to put forth some kind of new American initiatives in response to the Soviet ones, but they preferred to organize the provocative incident involving the South Korean aircraft to undermine talks with the USSR and to take the edge off antiwar protests in Western Europe and in their own country.

The U.S. and FRG leaders have worked together on a group of measures for the simultaneous "pacification" of the antimissile movement and the psychological preparation of the West German population for the deployment of the new missiles. Furthermore, a prominent place has been assigned to what the first

working conference of the "coordinators" of both countries²³ in February 1982 called "a rise in the level of mutual understanding between the U.S. and FRG populations." A special consultative body, consisting of many authoritative politicians and sociologists from both sides, was created to attain this objective. In the past year and a half the public has been the target of intense propaganda about the achievements of both countries in science, technology, literature and art, explanations, particularly among youth, of the role and objectives of NATO, and more active contacts between parliamentary, labor and youth organizations. The FRG Government has almost doubled the funds allocated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the development of contacts with the United States. They have been used to intensify exchanges through party, labor, church and youth organizations (in particular, the number of West German students visiting the United States is to be increased from 6,000 a year to 10,000), to work with American servicemen and members of their families in the FRG, to revise school textbooks on the history of both countries, to promote instruction in the German language and organize "German area studies" in the United States, to finance such undertakings as "U.S. friendship weeks," etc. The West German Bosch, Volkswagen, Thyssen and Krupp firms and others "contributed" 20 million marks for a "German-American cooperation program."²⁴ To combat anti-Americanism in the FRG, which is "raging through the country like a plague," according to DIE WELT (29 August 1983), all types of German-American clubs, associations, societies and unions are being formed. In the Rhineland-Pfalz region (which was the main region of emigration to the United States, where 60 million Americans of German origin now live), a society for German-American unity has been in existence for several years. The actions of this "society," particularly the distribution of posters, leaflets and pins depicting a heart in the colors of the FRG national flag and inscribed "Hearts for the United States," according to one of its organizers, G. Glessgen, are supposed to stimulate pro-American feelings in the FRG at a time when "the silence of the majority of West Germans in response to the antiwar demonstrations of a minority is undermining the basis of mutual trust," and to prove the ally's loyalty. It regards the establishment of good relations with American soldiers in the FRG as an important duty. The fact is that relations between American servicemen and the West German population have been complicated considerably in recent years. In June 1982, in a letter to then Chancellor H. Schmidt, General F. Kresen, the commander of the U.S. Seventh Army in Germany, complained about discrimination against American soldiers in West German cities and towns.

The American military, numbering around 250,000 servicemen in the FRG, encountered a hostile population in West Germany. In 1982 almost 100 houses and barracks were bombed and there were 57 cases of "serious provocations" against American military installations in the FRG; in 1983 the "diversionary actions against American echelons with weapons" and attacks on American military installations continued.²⁵ As the NEW YORK TIMES remarked, American soldiers in the FRG are treated as an occupation force.

The measures taken by Bonn to combat anti-Americanism include recommendations on the teaching of FRG history in the United States and U.S. history in the FRG. The recommendations drawn up by the Eckhart Institute in Braunschweig in close cooperation with American historians underscore the "special nature"

of the relations between the two countries, stemming from their common interests and values, and the American influence on public opinion and daily life in the FRG. They state that although the difference in the international importance of these countries and their domestic political differences have given rise to different approaches to political and economic objectives, in the history of relations between Germans and Americans there have been no stronger ties than the present bonds between the United States and the FRG.²⁶

The same idea was supposed to be reinforced by undertakings commemorating the 300th anniversary of a German settlement in the United States. In 1683, 13 families from the German Protestant sect of the Mennonites, who were being persecuted for their pacifism, emigrated from Krefeld to the United States and settled in a place now known as Germantown, near Philadelphia. The first of the festivities planned for 25 June 1983 to commemorate the tricentennial of this settlement ended in failure for its organizers. The "holiday" in Krefeld (the city of the famous antiwar appeal), attended by U.S. Vice-President G. Bush, was spoiled by 20,000 demonstrators protesting the new American missiles. The acme of the festivities was supposed to be the launching of the "Columbia" space shuttle, originally planned for 30 September 1983, with the first West German astronaut, Stuttgart physicist U. Merbold, as one of the members of its international crew. To the disappointment of the organizers of these festivities, the flight was first rescheduled for 28 October and was then postponed indefinitely. This put a perceptible pall over the festive ceremony in Philadelphia on 6 October. To mark the tricentennial, the "German-American Action Committee" in the United States announced that the Werner von Braun University would be opened there.²⁷ President K. Carstens of the FRG, who attended the festivities, opened an American research institute of contemporary German affairs in Washington.

These festivities had no precedent in the history of American-West German relations, although there had been cause for them. After all, the Germans appeared on the American continent and on the territory of what is now the United States long before 1683. In 1607 they were among those who accompanied Captain J. Smith to Jamestown, the first European settlement on U.S. territory. In 1626 it was a German, P. Minuit, who bought the island of Manhattan from the Indians.

In an attempt to put "American-German friendship" in a broad historical context, the mass media in both countries have enlisted the aid of authorities from fields of science, culture and art who once left Germany to settle in the United States; the fact that 20-30 percent of the American population is of German origin is underscored at every opportunity.²⁸ When Ronald Reagan addressed the Bundestag on 9 June 1982, he was lavish with his praise of the German contribution to the history of U.S. development, declaring that they had "cleared and cultivated" America, established its industry and developed its science and art.²⁹

The utility of these tactics is negligible on both sides. The indifference on both sides of the Atlantic, according to Director F. Loy of the Marshall Fund for Germany in Washington, "appears to be taking on dramatic dimensions."³⁰ In public opinion polls, 45 percent of the West German citizens

surveyed felt the need to stay "at a distance from the United States," 12 percent would be happy to see the Americans leave the FRG and 25 percent did not care. In 1983, 55 percent did not have much trust in the United States (36 percent in 1981). The supporters of an FRG foreign policy independent of the United States increased from 49 percent in 1980 to 69 percent in 1983.³¹ The FRG's desire for greater independence and the alienation between Germans and Americans testify, according to R. Putnam, a former adviser to President J. Carter, that "there are no simple answers to questions about the improvement of their relations."³² The tremendous potential of pacifist, antimissile forces in the FRG--an extremely undesirable and irritating development as far as the United States is concerned--demonstrates the failure of the efforts of ruling circles in both countries to prepare West German public opinion for the deployment of the new American missiles in the FRG. It also proves that the U.S. ability to influence the domestic political development of the allies has definite limits.

Old Problems

American-West German differences of opinion have traditionally been most apparent in the sphere of economic relations. The FRG's financial strength (it has the largest currency reserves in the capitalist world, approximately 3 times as great as American reserves) and its economic potential have contributed to the growth of the expansionist ambitions of West German industrial circles. This has been impeded, however, by several factors. They include the crisis in the West German economy and the world capitalist economy, which has intensified competition among the FRG's closest allies and has stimulated all types of protectionist measures on their part; Washington's demand for a larger West German contribution to NATO military preparations; the U.S. opposition to the development of West German trade with socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union.

The FRG economy is extremely vulnerable to any changes in external conditions because a third of its GNP is designated for export. The USSR accounts for a large share of West German exports. The Soviet Union is among the FRG's top ten trade partners. The volume of Soviet-West German trade totaled 6.6 billion rubles in 1982. Industrial orders from the USSR and other socialist countries secured the jobs of more than half a million West Germans. The desire of FRG economic circles to develop trade with the East, particularly at a time of crisis (2.5 million unemployed in 1983), is inconsistent with the American policy of curtailing economic contacts with the USSR and other socialist countries.

American-West German clashes over economic cooperation with the East also became particularly noticeable when the detente of the 1970's placed the economic interests of the FRG and other U.S. allies above their military interests. Washington's attempts to influence Bonn to reinstate the priority of military aspects in its foreign policy, particularly the 1978 NATO decision on the 3-percent annual increase in military spending and the "double decision" of 1979, have either had only limited results or have brought about undesirable developments for ruling circles in both countries.

The continued development of the FRG's economic cooperation with the socialist countries has become not only a vital necessity,³³ but also a cause of political conflicts with the United States. West German members of business and industrial circles, who supported the policy of detente in the 1970's for reasons of economic advantage, are not pleased by any of the prospects of Washington's current insistence on confrontation. According to H. Kohl's statement in Moscow in July 1983, long-range cooperation is "an important and solid foundation for stable, productive political relations over the long range." Economic cooperation with the USSR, in Bonn's opinion, is in no way contrary to FRG security interests.

In matters of East-West economic cooperation, Bonn's views are closer to the position of its West European partners than to U.S. policy. The new chancellor of the FRG has already made some attempt to express Western Europe's interests in this area. In any case, the West German press credits H. Kohl with the fact that the "sore point" of trade with the socialist countries did not become the "main topic" at the Williamsburg conference of the "big seven," as R. Reagan had hoped it would.³⁴

Apparently, Washington is not reluctant to underscore H. Kohl's role in this context in order to strengthen the position of his government in the FRG and in Europe in general. Just before he visited the United States in November 1982, the White House decided to cancel the sanctions against the "gas for pipes" project, which had been opposed in the West European capitals, especially in Bonn and Paris. It was through H. Kohl that the United States seemed to inform Western Europe of the relaxation of its rigid sanction policy. Soon after the meeting in Williamsburg, however, Washington ignored all agreements and announced that U.S. imports of some grades of steel would be limited, thereby dealing a severe blow to the FRG steel industry and West German exports.

Of course, the change of government in Bonn cannot eliminate the fierce competition between the United States and the FRG in "Third World" markets. H. Kohl feels that the FRG also has "vital interests" beyond NATO boundaries. As a country dependent on energy resources and sales markets (the FRG imports 88 percent of the petroleum it needs from developing countries and sends 23 percent of its exports there), West Germany is seeking new spheres of capital investment. After the influence of the United States and England in South America was undermined by Britain's war on the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, in which the United States took England's side, the FRG has tried to take their place there. The West German monopolies also have definite plans for the ASEAN countries and the Near and Middle East.

Here FRG interests conflict with U.S. interests in the political as well as the economic sphere. The development of trade and economic ties would be promoted by political stability, and in the Middle East by a peace settlement. But this is contrary to U.S. strategic plans. The resulting disagreements between Washington and Bonn, according to a leading West German expert on international affairs, K. Kaiser, are even more intense than their disagreements over compensation for the maintenance of American troops in the FRG. Whereas the United States gives the "Soviet threat" a prominent place in its

approach to problems connected with the "Third World," Kaiser notes, people in the FRG and in Western Europe believe that the majority of conflicts in the developing countries have nothing to do with East-West relations and arise from economic or domestic political disorder and difficulties. The majority of West European statesmen prefer non-military means of overcoming these difficulties and advocate social and economic reforms. "It would be a great mistake," K. Kaiser writes, "to hang the 'East-West' tag on each local conflict."³⁵

But this is precisely the policy of the present American Administration in Central America, in the Middle East and in Africa. Some Western political scientists have described this U.S. line as "alarmism bordering on hysteria," which could "poison American-West German relations."³⁶

Another cause of disputes with the United States is the West German military-industrial complex--the producer of many weapons which are not inferior to the best American models, and are sometimes even superior to them. Until recently the geography of West German weapon exports was strictly limited by FRG laws to the NATO framework. Under pressure from armament manufacturers, the FRG Government passed new laws in spring 1982, authorizing West German concerns to export weapons to regions of "vital importance to FRG security interests" outside NATO's boundaries.³⁷ This resulted in more intense competition between West German and American weapon exporters, and not only in the markets of the developing countries.

In December 1982 the U.S. Congress refused the Pentagon's request for funds to purchase weapons from the FRG. In response, Bonn canceled its own orders for American weapons. Demands for an unequivocal refusal to participate in the maintenance of American troops in the FRG were heard in the Bundestag. In Washington in April 1983, H. Kohl announced that "the weapon trade within NATO cannot be a one-way street."³⁸ Furthermore, in order to avoid the deterioration of relations with the United States, West German leaders had to announce the FRG's willingness to "actively support America in its military undertakings outside the NATO zone without the participation of the Bundeswehr." Bonn agreed to allocate 150 million dollars "for the NATO infrastructure."³⁹

The FRG's new commitments and its excessive expenditures in NATO are only aggravating the country's economic difficulties. In terms of per capita military spending and the proportion accounted for by military expenditures in the budget, the FRG is one of the leaders among the Western states. Severe financial difficulties forced Bonn to insist on the curtailment of the 15-year-old practice of compensatory payments for the presence of U.S. troops in the FRG in the middle of the 1970's (between 1961 and 1975, the FRG paid out around 40 billion marks, 26 billion of which was used for the purchase of American weapons).⁴⁰ Bonn refused the U.S. demand for the training of 80,000 reserve personnel to replace American soldiers in the event of their transfer from the FRG to the Persian Gulf zone. According to an FRG-U.S. governmental agreement of 15 April 1982, however, West Germany pledged to train 93,000 reserve personnel before 1987 for the "military coverage" of sites of American

weapon concentration for the six overseas U.S. armored tank and motorized divisions which would be transferred to the FRG "in the event of a crisis or war." Besides this, the West German side would pay for the construction of airfields and depots (the FRG is supposed to pay half of the projected sum of 1.2 billion marks).⁴¹ The preparatory work for the deployment of new American missiles in the FRG will cost it 20 million marks. The construction of new barracks, depots and residences for the American servicemen the Pentagon plans to transfer from the Rhine mine zone closer to the borders of the GDR will cost 15 billion marks. The projected replacement of Nike-Hercules missiles with Patriot missiles will cost the West German side almost 6 billion marks.⁴²

A 4-percent increase in annual military expenditures has been demanded from the FRG, and several U.S. senators have advocated the withdrawal of American soldiers from West Germany if it "does not pay." Although Bonn does not take these threats seriously, believing that the U.S. Administration and Congress will not allow this to happen, H. Kohl nevertheless made an intense effort to put the "European portion" of his foreign policy program in action as soon as he became chancellor: Bonn views the consolidation of West European cooperation in the economic, political and military spheres as a method of augmenting its foreign policy maneuverability in relations with the United States. Within a short period of time, he had several meetings with the French president, the British prime minister and Italian leaders. Kohl described the results of his meeting with F. Mitterrand as the first step toward a "common security policy." Even earlier, in his first policy statement, he advised a search for "new ways of uniting Europe."

Washington, on the other hand, is constantly reminding its allies of the limits of their independence and informing them that the "common" interests of the West must be placed above regional or national interests. It is securing the "obedience" of its allies by escalating tension in the world, especially in Europe. But a tense international situation is disadvantageous to the West European states, primarily the FRG, for economic reasons (the United States is making even higher demands with regard to military contributions to NATO) and for political reasons (the benefits of detente were quite tangible for them).

Therefore, although the Kohl Government's declared policy line of a "new beginning" in American-West German relations primarily presupposes the maintenance and reinforcement of particularly close relations with Washington, and common class interests prevail in this alliance in general, the friction and conflicts between the FRG and the United States have become a permanent element of their interrelations and show no signs of abating.

From the United States' principal West European partner, as Bonn is striving to represent itself, Washington can tolerate some signs of relative independence, based on the economic importance of the FRG, its political influence and its military contribution to NATO. Furthermore, to a considerable extent, Bonn's independent line rests largely on the fairly solid foundation of FRG cooperation with the socialist countries. Whereas in matters of military

policy the West German leadership has demonstrated virtually total support for the line dictated from overseas, apparently in the belief that its "inferior status" does not give it the right to behave in any other way, in matters of economic relations with the East Bonn has based its decisions largely on the experience of the decade of detente, without looking to Washington for approval. In the hope of developing trade with the socialist countries, the Bonn leadership rarely gives in to American demands for their curtailment, as this is not in the national interests of the FRG. The range of changes in Bonn's position in the direction required by Washington has proved to be quite limited.

At the same time, Bonn's "combination" tactic of simultaneously trading with the East and aiming nuclear missiles at it suffers from a shortage of realism and is not supported by many West Germans. The domestic political pressure exerted on ruling circles in the FRG, along with external, American pressure, put Bonn in a unique position and made its policy quite ambiguous. The duality inherent in Bonn's foreign policy even under its current leadership raises questions about the widely publicized "new strategic quality of American-West German relations in the Kohl era."

FOOTNOTES

1. DIE WELT, 15 November 1982.
2. THE ECONOMIST, 18-24 December 1982, p 50.
3. DIE WELT, 15 March 1983.
4. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 1 October 1982.
5. NEWSWEEK, 19 April 1982, p 64.
6. DIE WELT, 15 March 1983.
7. EUROPA-ARCHIV, 10 May 1981, pp 271-280.
8. DER SPIEGEL, 10 January 1983, p 28.
9. THE WASHINGTON POST, 13 March 1983.
10. PRAVDA, 5 July 1983.
11. NORDSEE ZEITUNG, 2 July 1983.
12. PRAVDA, 5 July 1983.
13. PARLAMENTARISCH-POLITISCHER PRESSEDIENST, 27 August 1982.
14. GENERAL-ANZEIGER, 1 July 1983.

15. DIE WELT, 15 March 1983.
16. NEWSWEEK, 28 February 1983, p 8.
17. VORWAERTS, & June 1983; EUROPA-ARCHIV, 25 July 1983, p 429; STERN, 21 July 1983, p 111.
18. DER SPIEGEL, 18 April 1983, p 39; STERN, 21 April 1983, p 164.
19. DER SPIEGEL, 15 August 1983, p 17.
20. DIE WELT, 18 April 1983.
21. DER SPIEGEL, 1 August 1983, p 32; DIE WELT, 27 July 1983.
22. DIE WELT, 28 July 1983.
23. As early as April 1981 the West German government requested then FRG State Minister H. Hamm-Brucher from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to draw up proposals on the improvement of relations with the United States. In January 1982, when H. Schmidt was in Washington, H. Hamm-Brucher and then Assistant Secretary of State L. Eagleburger were appointed coordinators of American-West German cooperation; in 1983 they were succeeded by former FRG Ambassador to Washington and now State Secretary of the FRG Ministry of Foreign Affairs B. von Staden and USIA Director C. Wick.
24. DIE WELT, 25 June 1983.
25. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 20 December 1982, p 36; DIE BUNTE ILLUSTRIERTE, 31 May 1983.
26. AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE, 3 April 1982, p 46.
27. DIE WELT, 27 June 1983.
28. AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE, 3 April 1982, p 28; DER SPIEGEL, 13 June 1983, p 129.
29. DIE WELT, 10 June 1982.
30. DER SPIEGEL, 15 August 1983, p 22.
31. Ibid., 30 November 1981, p 94; 7 February 1983, p 90; 10 January 1983, p 28.
32. Ibid., 15 August 1983, p 22.
33. According to the calculations of DER SPIEGEL, the reduction of Soviet exports of finished goods by half would cost the West 30 billion dollars and the East 4.5 billion (DER SPIEGEL, 18 April 1983, p 30).

34. DIE WELT, 29 April 1983; 3 May 1983.
35. EUROPA-ARCHIV, 10 May 1981, p 270.
36. See, for example, AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE, 8 August 1981, p 34.
37. MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, December 1982.
38. DIE WELT, 18 April 1983.
39. Ibid., 15 March 1983; THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 11 January 1983.
40. IPW-FORSCHUNGSHEFTE, Berlin, 1979, No 1, p 51.
41. EUROPA-ARCHIV, 25 July 1982, p D-33.
42. DIE WELT, 22 July 1983.

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U.S. TRADE-ECONOMIC EXPANSION IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 22 Dec 83 pp 1-5

[APN "digest" of article by G. I. Rubinshteyn in SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 12, December 1983]

[Text] In the 1970's and the early 1980's U.S. imperialism stepped up expansion in Africa. U.S. administrations exploited the disintegration of West European countries' colonial empires to penetrate Africa.

Although no longer in military and political control in Africa, West European countries preserve vast zones of influence there. That is why the USA's economic penetration of Africa has intensified contradictions among imperialist states.

In the 1970's the United States started to display a heightened interest in the import of mineral fuel. African oil became more advantageous for the United States compared with oil from the Middle East because of the known events in the latter region. The U.S. military-industrial complex also revealed great interest in some strategic raw materials plentiful in Africa.

As a result, in the 1970's the USA's trade with the developing African countries grew by almost 20 times, in current prices, with the yearly rate of increment in this commerce averaging 34 percent for the decade. This steep increase was due primarily to the U.S. import of oil when its world prices were growing. The share of these countries in overall U.S. imports, which constituted 2 percent in 1970, reached its peak in 1980 when it climbed to 14.4 percent. For some years now the United States has been the biggest importer of African products, and the USA's proportion in the exports of the developing African countries rose from 6.6 percent in 1970 to 30 percent in 1980.

In the 1970's, U.S. exports to the developing African countries increased by 6.6 times, in current prices, much less than imports. This is because, in particular, using their "special relationships" with African nations, America's competitors from Western Europe countered U.S. expansion. Japan also registered major successes in the drive for African markets. As a result, the share of the developing African countries in U.S. exports moved up insignificantly, from 2.3 percent in 1970 to 2.9 percent in 1980. In 1980 the United States held fourth place in the aggregate imports of these countries, following France,

West Germany and Britain. In the 1970's America's proportion of their imports remained stable, not exceeding 9 percent.

Although the United States has trade links almost with all African countries, the geography of this commerce is uneven. In 1980 some 85 percent of the aggregate U.S. imports from the developing African countries came from three nations, Nigeria, Algeria and Libya, which are major oil exporters. In 1982 these states absorbed close to 32 percent of overall U.S. exports to the developing African countries.

Of the remaining African countries, the biggest quantities of U.S. exports continue to flow to Egypt. Trade relations with Egypt are of great interest to U.S. administrations because Cairo holds the keys to the Middle East and also because Washington has close political and military contacts with it, contacts which have grown much stronger since the conclusion of the Camp David agreements. For several years now the United States has been the main trade partner of Egypt.

In the past few years the desire of U.S. administrations to receive military bases for the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force, oriented on the Middle East, has determined Washington's trade policy with regard not only to Egypt, but also some other African countries, primarily Morocco, Sudan, Somalia and Kenya. Washington concluded military agreements with them and supplied these countries with credits to import U.S. commodities. The United States created favorable conditions for private American companies interested in business with these countries. All this promoted trade. In the 1970's trade with Nigeria assumed special importance for the United States in tropical Africa.

Among America's permanent commercial partners are also Zaire, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Gabon and Ghana, which have considerable resources of minerals and farm produce for export. The U.S. economy is interested in these products. The United States also shows great interest in Zimbabwe, which it wants to push to the capitalist road of development so as to be able to exploit its natural riches.

As regards the African countries of socialist orientation, the United States is expanding economic and commercial relations with them in an effort to show them the "advantages" of capitalist development in order to penetrate deep into their economies and to influence, as far as possible, their policies. Thus, the United States imports oil from Angola and the People's Republic of the Congo and bauxites from Guinea. U.S. corporations are co-owners of the Mifergia Company, which is preparing to develop a major iron ore deposit in Guinea for export.

Other motives lie at the basis of Washington's economic and trade policy vis-a-vis South Africa, which it regards as the Western bulwark in Africa and the last bastion of imperialism in the region. Also, the United States attaches great strategic importance to the shipping routes leading around southern Africa. The United States has invested heavily in South Africa to prop up its reactionary regime, to consolidate the country's position in the imperialist system, to receive raw materials that are in short supply from South Africa

and to derive fabulous profits from the exploitation of South African workers.

The main items of U.S. exports to Africa are industrial plants, weapons and foodstuffs.

In the last few years, mineral fuel has held a major place in U.S. imports (in 1980 it accounted for 82.4 percent of the import of commodities from all African countries and for more than 80 percent of imports from the developing countries of the continent). At the same time, the basic import item--crude oil--and the import of oil products and natural gas from the African countries is so far insignificant. In the 1970's, the USA increased the import of some solid minerals from the African countries. Of major importance among U.S. imports today are chromium (from South Africa and Zimbabwe), manganese (South Africa and Gabon), cobalt (Zaire and Zambia), bauxites (Guinea) and metals of the platinum group (South Africa). The USA also systematically imports from the African countries high-quality iron ore, uncut and industrial diamonds, copper, aluminum, antimony, vanadium and columbite.

The proportion of agricultural raw materials in U.S. imports from Africa was reduced in the 1970's. This was due to the introduction in U.S. industry of synthetic materials replacing many kinds of those starting materials, and also due to the wider use made of local raw material resources by the emergent industries of the African countries themselves.

A major role in the Reagan Administration and circles adjoining it is now played by politicians striving, among other things, for greater subordination of the commercial policy of Washington to its military-strategic aims, for unreserved support to the South African regime and the maximum possible strengthening of U.S. commercial ties with that country, and for reliance on "pressuring tactics" in trade and economic relations with the developing countries of Africa. This sort of American policy and the practices of the U.S. monopolies are coming under the fire of scathing criticism in the developing countries of Africa.

Contradictions between the expansionist commercial and political line of the USA and the aspirations of the developing countries of Africa are thus growing more acute. It is only the cardinal restructuring of international economic relations on a just and democratic basis that can ensure in time equality and mutual benefit in U.S. trade with those states. There is growing awareness of the need to abandon the use in foreign trade of discrimination, diktat and political pressure on the developing and the socialist countries among broad sections of the U.S. public, too.

The prospects of development of U.S. trade with the African countries will within the next few years depend in considerable measure on the economic situation in the capitalist world. Under any circumstances, the U.S. monopolies will exert the maximum effort to split the ranks of the African developing countries supplying raw materials and put pressure on them as regards the prices of fuel and primary materials purchased by the United States. At the same time, one should expect speeding up by the USA of the export of goods to African countries with a view to pressing its rivals and evening out the balance-sheet of its trade with Africa.

U.S. FOREIGN AID SEEN HAVING MILITARY PURPOSES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 83 (signed to press 23 Nov 83) pp 77-81

[Article by A. D. Portnyagin: "Assistance Programs Become Unpopular in the Congress"]

[Text] It is probable that at no other time during the postwar period have allocations for foreign aid programs been so difficult to acquire from the U.S. Congress as they are now. "The United States is wasting money by offering this assistance"¹--with these words, American senators and congressmen expressed the feelings of their constituents when the draft budget for fiscal year 1984 was being discussed in the Congress.

This dissatisfaction is being compounded by many factors. As a result of the current administration's militarist line, there has been an unprecedented increase in military spending and simultaneous sharp cuts in allocations for social needs. The current administration has increased foreign assistance allocations considerably. In fiscal year 1982 the total was already 12.4 billion dollars, in 1983 it was 13.6 billion, and the administration has requested 17 billion for 1984.²

The excessive growth of these programs is due primarily to the fact that this assistance, which occupies a special place among the Reagan Administration's foreign policy instruments, is being extended to states aiding in the attainment of Washington's imperialist goals. To justify the White House's higher requests, Pentagon chief C. Weinberger informed the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 22 February 1983 that American aid is "the overseas equivalent of our defense efforts."³

In line with Weinberger's statement, assistance is offered for two main reasons. First of all, it is offered to countries whose territory can be used for hostilities against socialist states. The Pentagon includes Pakistan, Turkey, Thailand and South Korea among these countries. Secondly, it is used to support pro-American regimes suffering social cataclysms, such as those in the Sudan, Somalia and some other countries. Israel and, to a lesser degree, Egypt occupy a special position.

The growth of American foreign assistance programs in recent years has reflected the desire to draw new states into the U.S. orbit and to strengthen

the position of Washington's older clients. This approach has led to a situation in which assistance, particularly military aid, is being extended to countries authorizing the United States to use their military bases or to build American bases on their territory. As Under Secretary of State "for Security Assistance" W. Schneider declared at the same House hearings, the United States "must first learn how to acquire access to bases and learn the conditions on which they can be used. Only then can we determine the appropriate level of assistance." Assistance is also being used as leverage to subordinate the foreign policy of some developing states to American diktat. For example, according to the "Kirkpatrick doctrine" (J. Kirkpatrick--permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations), economic aid to various countries should be related directly to their support of the U.S. position in the United Nations.

A perceptible role in the offer of government aid to foreign states is played by the special funds used by U.S. leaders when they wish to avoid congressional "obstacles." One of them was established in 1961 and was designated for use by the President "for emergency military assistance to foreign states." This fund was used during the aggressive U.S. wars against Vietnam and Kampuchea and the military intervention in the affairs of Thailand, Liberia and El Salvador.⁴

In 1982 a special fund was established for the creation of "emergency" weapon reserves. The capital in this fund, now totaling around a billion dollars, secures the President's ability to offer pro-American regimes and U.S. allies military equipment at any time, without seeking congressional approval.

A commission on military and economic assistance, headed by former Deputy Secretary of Defense F. Carlucci, was recently established. Its members include congressmen, senators and representatives of the business community, labor unions and the academic community. They were requested to conduct a study of various forms of American assistance, including military aid. Contrary to the statement made by P. Ferson, spokesman for the Agency for International Development, that it was the commission's aim to help the "U.S. administration understand all the particulars of the matter," some members of the administration have admitted that it is actually supposed to secure support for assistance programs, particularly military ones, "by demonstrating the importance of foreign assistance for U.S. military policy."⁵

The Reagan Administration has radically revised all foreign assistance, which consists of an economic component, including programs of multilateral and bilateral aid, and a military component, known as "security assistance." The revisions reflected the White House's desire to transfer a maximum share of this assistance to the "security assistance" component, the main programs of which are those for military aid, overseas military sales, military training and preparations and economic support funds. When Secretary of State G. Shultz addressed the Congress, he resorted to an obvious juggling of the facts when he declared that "only" 43 percent of the foreign assistance extended by the United States was designated for military purposes.⁶

More complete data are cited in the CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT. In fiscal year 1982, it says, military aid exceeded economic aid in foreign assistance programs at the insistence of the Reagan Administration (see Table 1).

Table 1

Correlation of Assistance Programs

<u>Years</u>	<u>Total foreign aid</u>	<u>"Security assistance"</u>	<u>Economic aid</u>
1982:			
millions of dollars	12,377	6,624	5,753
%		53.5	46.5
1983 projections:			
millions of dollars	14,876	8,768	6,108
%		58.9	41.1
1983 allocations:			
millions of dollars	13,655	7,809	5,846
%		57.2	42.8

CQWR, 15 January 1983, p 92.

Therefore, military assistance already accounted for 57.2 percent of the "whole pie" in 1983 programs and was 1.185 million dollars higher than the figure for the previous fiscal year, while the increase in economic assistance was only 93 million dollars. Furthermore, with the exception of the relatively small foreign officers training program, all military assistance programs were expanded considerably.

This tendency is particularly apparent in the draft budget for fiscal year 1984, which the administration submitted to the American Congress in February 1983. Its total requests for foreign assistance programs are 14 percent higher than congressional allocations in the previous fiscal year (see Table 2).

The largest component of "security assistance" is the foreign military sales program, designated for the extension of loans for the purchase of American weapons. The administration has requested 4.4 billion dollars for this purpose, or 800 million dollars more than in 1983--an increase of 22 percent. In addition, it has requested 525 million dollars in the form of guaranteed loans, which were previously excluded from the 1983 budget by the Congress.⁷

The highest percentage increase has been projected for the "military assistance" program, which will be 158 percent higher than in fiscal year 1983 and will total 747 million dollars. The economic support fund, from which loans and subsidies are extended to pro-American regimes for the revitalization of economies overloaded by excessive military spending, is slated for an increase of 288 million dollars, or 11 percent. More than half of this fund will be used to patch up holes in the economies of Israel and Egypt.

The only foreign assistance item scheduled for a slight decrease is the non-refundable aid extended to Israel and Egypt as part of the overseas military sales program. It will consist of 1 billion dollars, or 175 million less than in fiscal year 1983. Nevertheless, these two key countries in the Middle East have been assigned the lion's share of American foreign assistance, just as in previous years: 2.5 billion dollars for Israel and 2.1 billion for Egypt.⁸

Table 2

Foreign Assistance, millions of dollars

<u>Programs</u>	<u>1983 allocations</u>	<u>Additional 1983 requests</u>	<u>1984 projections</u>
Military assistance	290.0	167.0	747.0
Overseas military sales			
nonrefundable	1,175.0	0.0	1,000.0
guaranteed loans	3,636.0	525.0	4,436.0
Military training and preparations	45.0	1.0	56.5
Economic support fund	2,661.0	294.5	2,949.0
Total "security assistance"	7,810.0	987.5	9,188.5
Economic aid:			
Multilateral program	4,420.5	249.5	5,323.4
Bilateral program	2,420.7	11.0	2,494.9
Total	14,651.2	1,249.0	17,006.8

CQWR, 5 February 1983, p 270.

The United States is continuing to build up Pakistan's military and economic potential and plans to increase its assistance to 525 million dollars in fiscal year 1984 (400 million in 1983). The position Pakistan has been assigned in Washington's strategy in South Asia is attested to by the fact that the administration has requested 465 million dollars from the Congress for India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal combined.

In the Far East the largest amount of foreign assistance will be received by the South Korean regime--230 million dollars. This, as C. Weinberger told the Congress, is more than half as high as the assistance the United States will offer to all East Asia in fiscal year 1984.

The military regime in El Salvador will receive the lion's share of American military assistance in Central America. It has been allocated 206.3 million dollars, or 40 million more than last year. Honduras, which the United States is using as a bridgehead for military actions and diversionary operations against Nicaragua, will receive 80 million dollars (35.5 million in 1983).

The Congress is disturbed by the constant growth of the military portion of American foreign assistance, which is being distributed primarily to reactionary undemocratic regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America, regimes representing a source of regional tension and threats to the security of neighboring states and a bottomless well absorbing huge sums from the American budget.

When Chairman C. Zablocki (Democrat, Wisconsin) of the House Foreign Affairs Committee called the session attended by G. Shultz to order, he informed Shultz that it would be difficult to justify assistance "far in excess of the current figure" at a time of constant cuts in domestic programs and an unemployment rate of 11 percent in the United States. For example, he stressed,

the part of the draft foreign assistance budget (7.1 billion dollars of the total 17 billion) to which the jurisdiction of his committee extends was "almost twice as high as the sum allocated for the job creation bill."⁹

The issue of aid to foreign states has essentially become a cause celebre in all parts of the United States. This was confirmed by Senator L. Pressler (Republican, South Dakota), who stressed that questions expressing "concern about foreign aid were raised" at each of the 25 meetings he held in his state.¹⁰ The aforementioned Zablocki stated quite frankly that "no electoral district supports aid to foreign states," despite the administration's efforts to convince Americans that this aid is in the national interest.

Warnings like these, writes famous CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT correspondent J. Felton, are being issued by long-time members of the foreign affairs committees of both congressional houses, who have supported assistance programs for some time, and by congressional newcomers, who "do not want to take the risk of voting for such politically unpopular programs."¹¹

Pentagon and State Department spokesmen tried to call the increased allocations for these programs a help to jobless Americans. Senators did not bother to conceal their sneers when W. Schneider asserted that most of the money allocated for assistance programs is used for the purchase of U.S. goods and can therefore be regarded as "an employment program for Americans." In response to this statement, P. Sarbanes (Democrat, Maryland) made the sarcastic comment: "Should we stand on our heads when we repeat these arguments to our constituents, or should we ask them to stand on their heads while they listen to them?"¹²

Even the congressmen and senators who have long supported military forms of assistance must be amazed by the rate at which the administration is increasing these allocations. For example, Senator C. Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut), a supporter of military assistance programs, said: "When military aid increases by 20.8 percent and the increase in development aid is only 3.3 percent, it appears that we are moving in the wrong direction."¹³ President J. Sewell of the Overseas Development Council (a private research organization) also opposed the increase in military aid: The administration, he said, "is too concerned with military aspects of security, and this concern is overly exaggerated."¹⁴

There have been heated arguments between the Reagan Administration and the Congress over aid to specific countries. Many American legislators are opposed to any further increase in military aid to the regimes in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. The increasingly aggressive nature of Reagan's foreign policy line has made the United States rely more on undemocratic regimes. For example, when G. Shultz addressed House and Senate subcommittees in March, he demanded that the legislators approve additional allocations for the military junta in El Salvador as quickly as possible. He implied that the United States intended to put the Salvadoran junta's army under its own control and take full responsibility for its maintenance. He said that 50 percent of its personnel would be retrained, and partly on U.S. territory.¹⁵

But these statements by administration spokesmen in the Congress are not supported by all legislators. Consequently, foreign assistance programs just manage to "squeak through" the Congress.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee voted to limit military aid to the Salvadoran regime in fiscal year 1983 to 65 million dollars. The corresponding committee in the Senate suggested that this aid be limited to 76.3 million dollars, 20 million of which would have to be spent on the training of Salvadoran officers on U.S. bases. Besides this, both committees passed resolutions prohibiting "the President's use of emergency powers to give El Salvador military assistance without congressional approval."¹⁶

The Congress also voted for cuts in military assistance to three African countries in the current fiscal year: 25 million dollars for Morocco (50 million less than the administration had requested), 81 million for Tunisia (45 million less) and 4 million for Zaire (8 million less). The administration did win some concessions from the legislators, however, in the case of additional military aid of 17 million dollars to Honduras (bringing the total up to 37 million); 75 million to Pakistan (a total of 275 million); 60 million to the Philippines (201 million); 50 million to the Sudan (76 million); 21 million to Indonesia (43 million); 19 million to Thailand (83 million).¹⁷

On 2 June the House of Representatives voted to allocate 251 million dollars in military and economic assistance to Lebanon in fiscal year 1983, with 101 million earmarked for military aid.¹⁸

Therefore, in spite of the Reagan Administration's attempts to pressure the Congress for unprecedented foreign assistance allocations, the legislators are beginning to realize how dangerous these plans could be from the standpoint of U.S. foreign policy and within the context of relations with their constituents, who will have to shoulder the heavy burden of these expenditures. For this reason, they have been increasingly reluctant to agree to all of the White House's militarist plans.

FOOTNOTES

1. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 19 February 1983, p 371 (hereafter called CQWR).
2. Ibid., 15 January 1983, p 92.
3. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 22 February 1983, p D148.
4. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 27 February 1983.
5. CQWR, 26 February 1983, p 425.
6. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, March 1983, p 70.
7. CQWR, 5 February 1983, p 271.
8. Ibid., 12 February 1983, p 346.
9. Ibid., 19 February 1983, p 371.

10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p 372.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., 15 January 1983, p 92.
15. THE WASHINGTON POST, 23 March 1983.
16. CQWR, 4 June 1983, p 1110.
17. Ibid., 23 April 1983, p 776.
18. Ibid., 4 June 1983, p 1135.

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U.S.-JAPANESE STRUGGLE FOR LEADERSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW COMPUTERS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 83 (signed to press 23 Nov 83) pp 97-104

[Article by G. B. Kochetkov]

[Text] A new stage of the U.S.-Japanese struggle for scientific and technical leadership in the capitalist world has begun. During this stage the struggle will be particularly intense in the development of new computers, which must surpass all existing computers in terms of calculating potential and possess elements of "artificial intelligence." Primacy in this field will be extremely important to each of the competing sides because this is not merely a struggle for leadership in one specific area of technological progress. Impending changes in the forms and methods of data processing and storage, according to many experts, could become the basis for radical economic changes on the threshold of the third millenium. Even now, the extensive use of microprocessors, the development of personal computers and the appearance of a new generation of robots and computer networks of various types have not only made substantial changes in the very process of physical production but have also influenced the financial sphere, the sale and distribution of products, industrial and consumer services, science and education, the media, filmmaking and many other fields of human endeavor. This is why the increasingly fierce competition in recent years by the two leading industrial powers in the capitalist world for scientific and technical leadership in the development of new very high-speed computers with elements of artificial intelligence is much more serious than the automobile, television and other "wars" that have broken out more than once between the United States and Japan. "The computer will lie at the basis of all major changes in the future. The Japanese have acknowledged that whoever controls the information revolution will actually acquire the more far-reaching 'geopolitical control' as well."¹ This is how Japanese business' new assault on American positions was described by a leading U.S. expert, M. Dertouzos, head of the computer research laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Fifth-Generation Computers: The Japanese Challenge

American experts were disturbed when a long-range project for the development of a new generation of computers began to be carried out in Japan in spring 1982 under the auspices of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and

Industry (MITI). In the United States this project was regarded immediately as a challenge by Japanese computer manufacturers to their American competitors.

Specialists regard the project as, firstly, part of a long-range program for the development of the "information sector" of the Japanese economy; secondly, an element of Japan's new scientific and technical strategy; thirdly, a major effort to strengthen Japanese capitalism's position in the struggle against its chief rivals, especially the United States.

Japan was the first capitalist country where ruling circles became fully aware of the importance of information as a promising stimulus of economic and social development. By the end of the 1960's a long-range goal had been set: to turn Japan into an "information-rich" country by the year 2000, necessitating the creation of a strong material and technical base for information activity in addition to the development of science, publishing, the media, etc.²

The key sector of this base is the computer industry. Some means of state-monopoly regulation were put in effect as early as the 1960's for its successful development through intrasectorial specialization by leading electronics manufacturers. The structural reorganization of the entire computer industry was conducted in 1971 under the supervision of the MITI to reinforce and intensify this process. The result was the formation of four groups of firms, headed by the main computer manufacturers, which divided the market among themselves. For example, the Fujitsu-Hitachi group specialized in the production of large and medium-sized computers, compatible with the equipment of IBM, the leader in the American computer industry. The Mitsubishi-Okai group concentrated on the production of small and mini-computers, also compatible with IBM equipment. The Toshiba-Nippon Electric group began working on computers of unique design. The subdivisions and affiliates of the Matsushita Company, making up a separate group, concentrated on the development of new types of computers.

The reorganization was carried out in line with far-reaching scientific and technical plans connected with the "Information Society" program. In contrast to the United States, which has sufficient scientific and technical potential and resources to conduct research and development in many advanced fields, Japanese monopoly capital has been forced by Japan's limited resources and less highly developed scientific and technical base to concentrate on specific, quite narrow fields. The formation of the abovementioned industrial groups made it possible to enlarge scientific centers, to enlist the services of leading scientists and to establish a basis for the organization of large-scale national computer development projects. In the 1970's there were more than 10 such projects,³ principal among which were the following:

1. The Creation of Systems for the Processing of Data in the Form of Graphic Symbols and Sounds. This project was carried out from 1971 through 1980. The main R & D operations were conducted by the MITI electrical engineering laboratory and were financed jointly by the state (25 million dollars) and five industrial firms (75 million). After the first machine was developed to

demonstrate the operation principles of the new data input equipment, each of the firms worked independently on putting the results of experimental design operations to work in the manufacturing stage.

This project is considered to be one of the most successful ones. It concluded with the development of verbal-input equipment, capable of recognizing words dictated by any individual with up to 98-percent accuracy, but only within the limits of a set vocabulary of 200 words. These machines are already being used widely in transport reservation services, automated office systems, data input equipment for the blind, etc. A character-recognition system was also developed, permitting the use of around 1,000 characters for direct data input in the computer memory with up to 95-percent accuracy (in all, around 10,000 characters are used in the Japanese language). Considerable progress was made in the development of three-dimensional visual systems for robots.⁴

2. The Development of Methods and Systems for the Enhancement of Program Quality and Performance (1973-1980). For the work on this project, a special Joint System Development Corporation was established. Its stockholders are 17 leading Japanese software firms and 13 banks and other financial organizations. The program was funded by the state and the private sector (25 million dollars each).⁵

As we know, the equipment accounts for 20 percent of the cost of a modern computer system and software accounts for 80 percent. According to some forecasts, the latter will account for 95 percent of the cost by 1990. But it is precisely this fact that constitutes the greatest difficulty for Japanese computer manufacturers.⁶ Although in some applied fields, such as airline reservations and banking operations, the quality of the programs developed by Japanese specialists meets world standards, the Japanese computer industry as a whole is considered to be around 4-5 years behind the United States in terms of program quality and performance. In particular, this is connected with the fact that virtually all programs are composed in English, and this increases the time required for the training of highly skilled programmers and introduces the complication of a foreign language into their work.⁷ All of this has a particularly serious impact on programs for the resolution of various scientific and technical problems, each of which requires an individual approach. One of the aims of this program was the development of algorithmic languages in Japanese symbols. For example, a computer language was developed with the use of Japanese characters, but it is not being used extensively.

This program coincided with the intensive introduction of personal computers, the institution of broader government stimulation in the field of software development and a rise in the demand for packaged applied programs, which gave strong momentum to the development of this subbranch of the computer industry. By the beginning of the 1980's, according to the estimates of Japanese specialists, the quality of Japan's packaged applied programs met world standards and their export to the United States was given serious consideration.⁸

3. The Development of Very Large Integrated Circuits (VLIC) (1976-1980). Within a short period of time, between 1976 and 1980, a total of around

350 million dollars was spent on R & D in this field, with 139 million allocated from the state budget.⁹ The aims of the project were the development of comprehensive technology for the production of VLIC's with fewer defects than existing equipment, the development of systems for their automated design, etc. A special VLIC Development Association was established to work on this project and was managed jointly by the MITI and four industrial groups of computer manufacturers.¹⁰ The project was distinguished by the intensive adoption of American technology: Up to a third of the total cost of the project was accounted for by purchases of U.S. licenses and patents.¹¹ After the Japanese firms had mastered the technological achievements of their rival, however, they made an important breakthrough: Within 4 years they applied for around 700 of their own patents in this field. American VLIC manufacturers had to face serious competition in the Japanese market and even in their own: By 1979 more than 40 percent of the American market for the most popular integrated circuits with a 16k semiconductor memory belonged to Japanese firms.¹²

4. The Program for the Development of a Supercomputer (1981-1988). The purpose of this program is the development of new technological designs for very high-speed and highly reliable computer elements. Most of the work on this program is being conducted in two areas: the use of superconductivity and the so-called "Josephson junction," and elements with a gallium arsenide base. Basic research in both areas has indicated that these problems could be solved in principle. The task consists in developing acceptable industrial technology. It is believed that the success of this project will depend on Japan's ability to catch up with the United States in a field in which it has been conducting research since the beginning of the 1960's.¹³ All of the supercomputers in use today (74 in all) are American-made. Japanese specialists hope to close this gap by following the trail blazed by Americans and thereby avoiding the mistakes their rivals made.

The MITI already financed supercomputer research for several years within the framework of other programs. This project will be completely financed by state budget funds (140 million dollars) and will be supervised solely by the ministry.¹⁴

5. The Fifth-Generation Computer Project. This project is expected to take 10 years. Plans envisage state funding of 40 million dollars a year from 1982 on, or almost double the grants awarded by the American Government in this field. The participants in the work in the initial stages will be the MITI, the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone state corporation and some private companies--Fujitsu, Hitachi, Nippon Electric, Mitsubishi, Toshiba, Oki, Matsushita and Sharp.

A special Institute for New Generation Computer Technology (ICOT) was established in June 1982 to supervise the work.¹⁵ This is a research consortium to which each of the nine participating firms contributed its best young scientists. Japanese science as a whole has a fairly conservative structure, and young researchers rarely have a chance to work independently. The head of the scientific part of the program, Professor Katsuhiro Fuji, director of ICOT, believes that the reliance of scientists under the age of 35 is

justified by the fact that all participants will return to their own companies when the project has been completed and will head the incorporation of research results in specific development projects.

The main function of ICOT is the organization of intensive basic research, and this is one of the main distinctive features of the program. There has never been another case in the history of the Japanese electronic industry when companies have made any kind of major technological discovery. The main fields in which Japanese firms have won a leading position are household electronics, auxiliary equipment and, in recent years, personal computers--in other words, industries developing as a result of R & D in the mainstream of general-purpose computer manufacture.

Until recently, Japanese computer manufacturers were catching up with their American competitors only in terms of their level of scientific and technical progress. Familiarization with U.S. scientific achievements gave them a chance to move ahead more quickly and at a lower cost. And whereas the gap between the United States and Japan in the scientific and technical level of computers was equivalent to around 10 years at the beginning of the 1970's, the gap had been closed completely in the area of equipment and had been reduced to 4 years in the area of software by the beginning of the 1980's, according to the estimates of both Japanese and American experts.¹⁶

But following in the channels of American scientific and technical development allowed Japan only to catch up with the United States. Now the leaders of Japanese industry are faced with a dilemma: Should they make use of the economic advantages of "followers" or become leaders and blaze their own trail.

The latter course was chosen, and to this end emphasis was transferred from applied research and development to basic research. Furthermore, project administrators are underscoring the fact that they do not hope to develop a sample market computer, but to surmount the general problems facing cybernetics in the 1980's.¹⁷ For the same reason, they are not naming any of the characteristics of new generation computers but are simply saying that they should "far surpass all existing models."¹⁸

During the initial stages the prototype of the future computer was a machine with many parallel processors, operating on the "data flow" principle, in which each successive processor begins to work after the preceding one. The language for this machine was PROLOG (programming in logic). An important feature of the fifth-generation computer should be the use of elements of so-called "artificial intelligence" in systems programs. This primarily means the possibility of data input in natural languages¹⁹ and an associative memory. In other words, the machine will not only recognize symbols but will also remember them and distribute them in its memory in accordance with associations. This kind of computer is expected to produce more conclusions and advice than results of calculations. For this purpose, Japanese scientists believe, its memory should contain more than 20,000 rules of behavior in the real world and more than 100 million facts with which the machine can validate its "advice." It is indicative that the Japanese themselves prefer to call this a "cognitive data processing system" rather than a computer.²⁰

The new generation of computers is also expected to be self-programming. There have even been rumors that when the fifth-generation computer project was first proposed (in 1978), Japan's tendency to lag behind the United States in the programming field motivated some to suggest the need for a machine which would not require any programming. In 1979-1981 a special group of scientists amplified this idea to the scales of a new massive national project.²¹ Some Japanese specialists believe that the main discoveries required for the abovementioned features of the new computers have already been made but have not reached the stage of development as yet.²²

The American Response

American specialists have had a dual reaction to the technical ideas lying at the basis of the Japanese project. For example, IBM chief specialist L. Brandscomb, a leading computer expert, feels that the 1980's will be a period of progress mainly in the software field, and that this will be the result of achievements in the area of artificial intelligence.²³ An assessment of the potential in this field also requires consideration for the forecast of MIT Professor M. Minsky, one of the chief specialists in the field of artificial intelligence, who believes that a VLIC-based computer with numerous parallel processors could be developed within the next 5 years, but it will take another 5-20 years for programmers to fully master the new computer. This is corroborated, in particular, by the fact that the results of artificial intelligence projects of the early 1970's are only now beginning to be used in mass-produced computers.²⁴

American specialists have pointed out the fact that whereas work in the United States is conducted by relatively small groups, the Japanese project will involve more than 200 highly skilled specialists. This concentration should produce definite results. As one American scientist remarked, "we know more in each of the fields pertaining to the project, but we do not have this kind of comprehensive approach."²⁵

Many American scientists feel, however, that research in the field of PROLOG and "data flow" processors entails too many fundamental difficulties to be genuinely promising. They also believe that the first stage of the project will take much longer and could exceed the entire planned 10-year period.

To speed up this process, Japan has asked all countries to take part in the project and form an international team of scientists. American firms and universities have not responded to this invitation. Hoping to retain their leadership, the Americans are carefully guarding access to their R & D results. As one leading expert on U.S. competition with Japan, Professor C. Johnson from the University of California in Berkeley, stated, the Japanese "are making an earnest effort to compete with us in applied research and development, but they probably will not succeed. This is why their answer to this problem is the formation of multinational research groups and the use of cartels."²⁶

The governments of England and France have already expressed interest in the project and have sent delegations to Tokyo, but no agreements have been signed as yet. Many matters, particularly the ownership of future patents, have not been settled.

In the capitalist world, only the United States, which has conducted research in all of the main fields of scientific and technical progress, is capable of initiating projects of this kind.

In the words of IBM President J. Opel, the fifth-generation computer project "is more of a game than a reality. Many American firms are moving in this direction but are not publicizing this as a fifth-generation computer."²⁷ Nevertheless, American computer manufacturers and the U.S. Government were seriously disturbed by Japan's challenge. The first to react was the business community. In 1982 retaliatory measures began to be taken on the initiative of a leading U.S. firm, Control Data. These measures took the following forms.

First of all, the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation was established. Its organizers were 12 giant corporations, including Control Data, Honeywell, Motorola and the Radio Corporation of America. The purpose of this new corporation was the concentration of resources in decisive fields of advanced research. Firms have no incentive to invest money in these fields under ordinary circumstances: a high level of risk, difficulties in patenting fundamental research results, etc. Now that the Japanese competitors have minimized the scientific and technical gap and have resolved to overtake the United States, only collective efforts, ensuring less risk, can give research the necessary momentum.

The establishment of this non-profit research corporation with an annual budget of around 75 million dollars and a staff of 250 researchers marked a departure from the tradition of assigning the majority of basic research projects to universities. Japanese experience was utilized in its organization: Each of the participating companies will send its leading scientists to work on the corporation staff for a term of up to 4 years. In exchange, the participating firms will have exclusive ownership rights to project results for 3 years before their publication.²⁸

The American business community's second important retaliatory measure was the organization of the Semiconductor Research Corporation that same year. It was formed by 13 companies producing microelectronic elements, headed by IBM, Control Data, Digital Equipment, Motorola, Intel and Hewlett-Packard.²⁹ This corporation was also founded for the purpose of pooling resources and reducing the risk of basic research in the VLIC field. Its 1984 budget will be around 30 million dollars. In contrast to the previous organization, however, it will not conduct independent research but will conclude contracts for the work with universities and specialized research organizations.

In addition to these measures taken by the business community, certain moves were made by the U.S. Government. The Department of Defense Advanced Research Program Agency drew up its own program with an estimated total cost of a billion dollars. Its goal is U.S. supremacy in the field of supercomputers and "artificial intelligence." It is significant that all of the main development projects of the last 25 years in the sphere of information technology, such as machine time-sharing, networks, color graphics and many others, were contracted by this agency for use in the military sphere. The "thinking" computer is quite appealing to the military. It can be used in unmanned vehicles, automatic

submarines and land-based weapon systems. The high-performance potential of the new computers in combination with the high operational speed of weapon systems can give these systems new properties. Besides this, the Pentagon is working on the use of artificial intelligence to develop expert appraisal systems to be used for consultations on combat tactics or for the coordinated interaction of weapon systems.

Japan has taken a major step to overcome its dependence on the Americans in this key area of scientific and technical progress. It hopes to win the support of England, France, the FRG and other developed Western countries in its struggle against the United States.

American ruling circles are disturbed by Japan's challenge and are striving to retain their leading position. The U.S.-Japanese competition in computer design and manufacture is a new and extremely serious symptom of the intensification and expansion of inter-imperialist conflicts and of their extension to all spheres of human endeavor, including science and technology.

FOOTNOTES

1. NEWSWEEK, 4 July 1983, p 28.
2. "The Information Society: A Year 2000 Japanese National Goal. Computer White Paper," Tokyo, 1970. In 1978 a similar program was proposed in France (S. Nora and A. Minc, "L'informatisation de la Societe," Paris, 1978). In a special report to the President in 1976, the U.S. Domestic Affairs Council proposed a single national policy on the development of information resources, but this proposal has not taken the form of an integral national program as yet ("National Information Policy. Report to the President of the United States," Wash., 1976).
3. "International Competition in Advanced Industrial Sectors: Trade and Development in the Semiconductor Industry. A Study Prepared for the Use of the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress," Wash., 1982, p 132.
4. BUSINESS WEEK, 14 December 1981, pp 62, 64.
5. DATAMATION, September 1976, p 97.
6. JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT, February 1983, p 8.
7. FORTUNE, 4 October 1982, p 84.
8. BUSINESS WEEK, 14 December 1981, p 56.
9. "International Competition in Advanced Industrial Sectors," pp 55, 132.
10. Ibid., p 92.
11. Ibid., p 55.

12. Ibid., p 56.
13. IBM has been conducting experiments in this field since 1964 (JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT, February 1983, p 7).
14. BUSINESS WEEK, 14 December 1981, p 64.
15. FORTUNE, 4 October 1982, pp 82-88.
16. NEWSWEEK, 9 August 1982, p 21; DATAMATION, December 1980, p 176.
17. FORTUNE, 4 October 1982, p 88.
18. In reference to statements like these, American experts have noted that Japanese firms have already overtaken many of their American competitors in terms of the quality of most computer models and have almost caught up with the world leader in this field--IBM. For this reason, one of the principal practical goals of the project is to develop a computer with higher performance potential which is cheaper and easier to use, "for the purpose of defeating IBM, and not coexisting with it" (BUSINESS WEEK, 14 December 1981, p 52).
19. By 1990 the computer is expected to understand around 10,000 words (BUSINESS WEEK, 14 December 1981, p 66).
20. FORTUNE, 4 October 1982, p 88.
21. Ibid., p 84.
22. NEWSWEEK, 9 August 1982, p 34.
23. BUSINESS WEEK, 6 July 1981, p 32.
24. FORTUNE, 14 June 1982, pp 152, 160.
25. BUSINESS WEEK, 14 December 1981, p 66.
26. Ibid., p 62. It is significant that one of the distinctive features of these projects is a general atmosphere of active cooperation by Japanese firms with American ones. For example, Fujitsu, the Japanese leader in computer engineering, is forming joint enterprises with leading American firms for the development of new products. And Sony is even inviting American specialists to develop software for its word processors (DUN'S REVIEW, August 1981, pp 76, 79).
27. FORTUNE, 4 October 1982, p 82.
28. NEWSWEEK, 4 July 1983, pp 29-31.
29. Ibid., p 31.

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FIRST EDITION OF DIPLOMATIC ALMANAC REVIEWED

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[Review by V. V. Zhurkin of book "Diplomaticheskii vestnik. God 1982" [Diplomatic Herald. 1982], Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1983, 280 pages]

[Text] The family of Soviet almanacs, which has grown in recent years and covers all new fields of knowledge, has been supplemented by another interesting publication on Soviet foreign policy issues and international relations. The first edition of "Diplomaticheskii vestnik," prepared by a group of authors from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Academy, was published in 1983.

It contains analyses of a broad range of foreign policy issues of our day. A distinctive feature of "Diplomaticheskii vestnik" is its broad range of subject matter, its multigeneric nature--to the degree that this term can be applied to this kind of publication. The almanac contains full-length articles on major issues, the memoirs of renowned Soviet diplomats and extensive reference material and scientific information.

The first edition of "Diplomaticheskii vestnik" was published at a time when the international political climate had grown quite cold and the danger of war, engendered by the aggressive policy of the United States and NATO, had increased. In the foreword, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, says that "the contemporary stage of world development is distinguished by perceptibly heightened international tension. In response to the stronger international positions of the socialist community and the successes of revolutionary and liberation movements, the most aggressive imperialist circles, with the current American administration in the lead, launched a campaign against the process of international detente, which had been acquiring increasingly distinct outlines since the beginning of the 1970's. An arms race of unprecedented scales, flagrant intervention in the affairs of sovereign states and the use of violence, diktat and threats--these make up the line of the NATO bloc and, above all, of its main force, the United States, a line with dangerous implications for the cause of peace" (p 3).

This policy line is the opposite of the peaceful line of the USSR and the entire socialist community. "The Soviet Union believes that any state which

makes policy in the expectation of fighting and winning a nuclear war is displaying madness and is playing an irresponsible and adventuristic game with the future of human civilization," A. A. Gromyko writes. "The main thing now is to defend the peace and eliminate the danger of war. This is the aim of Soviet foreign policy efforts.

"The profoundly humane and truly peaceful nature of the foreign policy of the socialist countries is clearly reflected in this struggle. The socialist world is the principal tangible force capable of guarding mankind against the danger of a devastating nuclear war" (p 3).

The struggle between these two lines, between these two main tendencies in world politics, is the subject of most of the articles in "Diplomaticheskii vestnik." The current foreign policy line of the United States, which has led to the present exacerbation of international affairs and the increased danger of a global nuclear missile conflict, is analyzed in depth.

The reasons why the most aggressive imperialist circles began to pursue their current belligerent anti-Soviet line are given considerable attention in the almanac. As V. F. Petrovskiy remarks, "frightened by the increasing severity of the general crisis of capitalism and the scales of social changes in the world, these circles have made unconcealed attempts to find solutions to the difficulties encountered by their policy line in an arms buildup and in the cultivation of violence, constantly implying that nuclear weapons might possibly be used" (p 76).

The authors talk about the unpredictable consequences of the irresponsible power plays of U.S. ruling circles in the international arena in the dangerous atmosphere they have generated. "In an atmosphere of international tension and arms race escalation," S. L. Tikhvinskiy writes, "it is quite possible that an explosive situation will take shape, causing events to go out of control and leading to the maximum escalation of a conflict, to the point of nuclear war. The probability of this catastrophic outcome is reinforced by the evolution of American strategic ideas in the direction of a broader range of possibilities for the use of nuclear weapons. Washington's plans for "limited" nuclear war, based on the improvement and diversification of the nuclear arsenal, are lowering the nuclear threshold and erasing the critical boundaries between conventional and nuclear conflicts" (p 13). The military threat is being aggravated not only by Washington's openly militarist preparations, but also by its adventuristic behavior in the political, ideological and economic spheres.

The behavior of American diplomats at arms limitation and reduction talks serves the same belligerent goals. As V. L. Israelyan cogently demonstrates in his article, the United States is trying to use these talks to become militarily superior to the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries and to conceal its own intensive preparations for war.

Various aspects of the interrelations between the United States and its allies are discussed in several articles. Their authors cogently reveal the complexity and ambiguity of these relations, representing a combination of Washington's flagrant and not always futile attempts to impose its will on its allies and

actions which undermine the imperialist coalition and exacerbate conflicts between its members. For example, the Reagan Administration's hegemonic behavior in the sphere of world economic relations and its attempts to impose a single line (one benefiting the United States) on its allies in relations with socialist and developing countries are analyzed in the article by I. D. Ivanov. This author also notes the obvious erosion of the "U.S.-instigated trade boycott of the USSR on the false pretext of the Afghan and Polish events" (p 122). The scandalous failure of Washington's attempts to stop deliveries of West European oil and gas equipment to the USSR is a vivid example of this.

This applies not only to economics, but also to other spheres of interrelations in which the United States' allies, especially some West European countries, have displayed increasing persistence in their attempts to pursue their own independent policy line. "This period of severely escalated tension," G. A. Vorontsov accurately notes in this connection, "has been a harsh test for the West Europeans. Above all, it tested the strength of their independence. It was precisely at this difficult time that they learned that the military factor is no longer capable of playing its previous, virtually 'absolute' role in reducing all West European economic and political objectives to a common Atlantic denominator" (p 136). It is becoming increasingly difficult for the United States to count on the "obedience" of the allies even at a time of heightened international tension.

The first edition of "Diplomaticheskii vestnik" contains the highly interesting memoirs of prominent Soviet diplomats. V. A. Zorin discusses his experience in diplomatic service in France in the 1960's and 1970's and the establishment of detente on the European continent. The multilateral Helsinki consultations of 1972-1973, preceding the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, are the subject of L. I. Mendelevich's report.

The Soviet State's diverse efforts to consolidate international security and prevent war are described in these and other sections of the new almanac. "International reaction," A. A. Gromyko writes, "is waging genuine psychological warfare against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, using every possible means of ideological brainwashing. Under these conditions, it is particularly important to publicize the Leninist peaceful foreign policy line of the CPSU, inform the masses of the danger of the arms race the imperialists have started and of the grave implications of the aggressive militarist policy line of the United States and NATO, and refute the myth of the 'Soviet military threat'" (p 4). The new almanac represents another contribution by Soviet researchers to the performance of these functions.

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PROBLEMS OF THE PRESIDENCY

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[Report on discussion of presidential power in the United States by researchers from the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] A discussion of presidential power in the United States was held in the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, and was attended by researchers from the departments of domestic political and social affairs and ideological affairs. It was particularly pertinent in view of the upcoming presidential elections in 1984.

The discussion was called to order by Doctor of Historical Sciences A. A. Kokoshin, who focused the researchers' attention on problems of presidential authority in general. What are the long-, medium- and short-range tendencies with regard to the presidency in the 1980's? What are the internal contradictions within these tendencies? With what processes in government agencies and in the political system of state-monopoly capitalism in general are the tendencies with regard to presidential power connected in the first, second and third cases? What additional criteria or methods, including quantitative ones, can be proposed for evaluating the status of presidential authority and the influence or effectiveness of a particular administration? These questions, which were raised by the speaker, set the tone for the entire discussion.

A. A. Kokoshin: It appears that the long-range tendency, which first made its appearance many decades ago and acquired distinct outlines during the period of transition to the imperialist stage of development in the United States, the tendency toward stronger presidential power, will continue to be an influential one in the current decade. The reason for this is the continued existence of a group of objective international and domestic factors determining the makeup of present-day American capitalism. In terms of a number of parameters, this tendency might have been even stronger in recent years.

The medium-range tendency probably dates back to President Johnson's last years in office and is reflected in the decline or even the crisis of the presidency. It culminated in the Watergate affair and the forced resignation of R. Nixon. This, however, was not the end of the crisis. The subsequent administrations of G. Ford and J. Carter functioned under the shadow of

Watergate, and largely under the conditions of the same protracted crisis. By the beginning of the 1980's there was a consensus in the U.S. ruling class with regard to the need to reinforce presidential power and restore the authority of the presidency in American and international public opinion and with regard to the President's actual ability to conduct a stable foreign, military, economic and social policy. Many businessmen and politicians became aware that even the most active Congress was no substitute for an authoritative leader, or President, in several areas of government policy.

To a considerable extent, this explains the treatment of the Reagan Administration by opposition groups and the political coalition supporting the President, with consideration, of course, for the fact that the opposition was in a state of confusion and disorientation after the 1980 elections. Therefore, the short-range tendency seems to coincide with the long-range one.

It is no coincidence that I said "seems," A. A. Kokoshin continued. We are now witnessing the growing strength of the opposition and the intensification of centrifugal forces in the coalition supporting the administration.

A few other factors appear to influence the selection of potential chief executives in the United States. In particular, the election mechanism has changed considerably: Primaries have increased in number and in significance, and television now plays a more important role. The American elections, which have traditionally had all the characteristics of an entertaining show, now resemble a performance more than a serious political event.

The process by which contenders are selected is also influenced by the fact that the ruling elite on the national level is less homogeneous than it was, for instance, in the first postwar decades. Regions dominated by so-called "new money"--Texas, California and the Deep South--have much more representation and influence on the national level. As a result of the advancement of the proteges of Texas and California monopolists, politicians from the northeast, who were once the engineers and promoters of the "cold war," have been pushed into the background. It is one of the bitter ironies of history that they are almost totally excluded from foreign policy decisionmaking now that many of them have moved to a relatively constructive stand on matters pertaining to relations with the socialist community.

E. A. Ivanyan: In 1971 the American Center for the Study of Presidential Authority held a symposium in Montauk, New York, to discuss the future prospects for the development of this authority. Speakers avoided all descriptions of the current situation in American politics, but their statements included conclusions and facts which indicated signs of a growing crisis of presidential authority in the political system.

Subsequent events--the Watergate affair, R. Nixon's resignation, the short stay of "temporary President" G. Ford in the White House, the failures of "political outsider" J. Carter and the set of political, socioeconomic and ideological problems connected with the arrival of R. Reagan in the White House--gave many American analysts of presidential power the grounds to openly discuss the crisis of this power and to seek ways of correcting the situation.

But I think it is too early to speak of a crisis of presidential authority on the institutional level. This is more of a functional crisis, and indirect evidence of this can be found in the approximate balance of power within the United States between those who support the limitation of the presidential office to one 6-year term and those who support the 22d amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which limits the stay in the White House to two 4-year terms.

A. A. Kokoshin quite accurately noted the increasing influence of the primaries on the American electoral process. In my opinion, he said, the increase in the number of states where primaries are held and in their influence on the electoral process is not merely a trend accompanying the crisis in the leading bourgeois political parties, but is also a direct result of this crisis. Even the indistinct boundaries which separated one leading U.S. bourgeois party from the other during the first postwar years have now been "erased." The primaries have turned into something like a preview of political forces on the local level, with the aim of ascertaining the need for adjustments in the strategy and tactics of the White House campaigns of emerging political coalitions.

The rise of the right wing of the American political spectrum, with its nucleus consisting of "social conservatives" (Southern Democrats and "blue-collar" workers) and "economic conservatives"--Republicans--was by no means coincidental. The preparations for this were being made, behind the scenes but with a definite goal in mind, throughout the postwar period and were reflected in the dramatic, and therefore seemingly spontaneous, "spurts" of activity by the supporters of Senators R. Taft in 1952 and B. Goldwater in 1964, and finally in the presidential election victory of Ronald Reagan in 1980, following his two unsuccessful White House bids in 1968 and 1976.

Liberal bourgeois and moderate political circles in the United States obviously misunderstood and underestimated the long-range importance and dangerous implications of the redistribution of forces between the traditional political coalitions of both parties and the creation of a new majority coalition, a process which was already quite apparent by the middle of 1976. To this day, the criticism of Ronald Reagan's domestic and foreign policy and of the socioeconomic programs and ideological escapades of the neoconservative leaders of the current administration by liberal bourgeois and moderate political circles conveys the general impression of a passive and complacent attitude toward the possibility of a new, third party with extreme rightwing aims.

In view of all this, we could conclude that the American political system displays more signs of crisis now than at any other time in this century.

T. Z. Dzhaparidze: In our day the people who are politically active in elections are the generation of people who experienced the defeat of American imperialist aggression in Korea and Vietnam, took sides in the struggle for social and civil rights and lived through the Kennedy assassination and the Watergate scandal. This generation has essentially rejected the idealized romantic view of presidential authority.

The political atmosphere in which the head of the White House functions has changed considerably. The crisis of the two-party system of American capitalism has grown more acute, many "political action committees" have come into being and Congress has become more active. The political process itself has become more complex. Similar changes have been seen in various links of presidential power as well, although these have been less apparent due to the specific features of their functioning. Within these subdivisions, "power centers" have been fragmented among various specialties, and this has given the heads of these agencies more opportunity to influence the President.

All of these tendencies have affected the behavior of the White House chief. In minor questions of policy, he has to, as President W. Taft put it, "play to the gallery": to consider the interests of secondary participants in the decisionmaking process, to whom the White House paid little attention until recently.

Of course, all of this does not "restrict" presidential power. There is no doubt that the U.S. ruling class has no interest in weakening the position of the White House. By virtue of its constitutional, institutional and political status, the successful activity of other subdivisions of the machinery of state on the federal and state levels depends on the effective functioning of the White House.

As we know, the White House is only the top of the pyramid whose base consists of the impressive political machinery of the institution of the presidency. No other executive agency has undergone such frequent reorganization. For example, whereas only 71 people worked for the President in 1939, by 1950 his staff numbered 1,100, and now the figure has reached 1,700. Just 10 years ago the budget of the White House staff totaled 54 million dollars, but the sum requested from the Congress--and allocated by it--for this year is 250 million dollars.

In the future the organizational reinforcement of the institution of the presidency and the appearance of several new subdivisions within it could possibly reduce the personal influence of the White House chief (particularly if he has to carry as much "political baggage" as, for instance, J. Carter and R. Reagan) and could give his closest advisers more opportunity to manipulate presidential power.

Yu. A. Ivanov: I cannot agree completely with the previous speakers. First of all, I would like to say a few words about the President's relationship with the Congress, particularly in matters of foreign policy.

Swiss jurists who studied the U.S. Constitution in the middle of the last century expressed the opinion that it essentially made a presidential dictatorship possible. A hundred years later, in the 1950's and 1960's, when the institution of the presidency had grown perceptibly stronger for several reasons, many American researchers regarded this as a natural process and predicted the continuation of this trend. Nevertheless, a presidential dictatorship has never been established in U.S. history, and the events of the last decade indicate that presidential power did not grow perceptibly stronger during this period and that it even might have grown weaker to some degree.

This was the result of the constitutionally secured principle of "checks and balances" and, above all, of the activity of the most influential of these "balances"--the Congress. Its heightened foreign policy activity coincided with the failures of the four last presidents in this area.

Since all of the strata and segments of the dominant bourgeois class are represented much more extensively in the Congress than in the center of the executive branch--the White House--the Capitol represents the particular link of government which adjusts presidential policy with a view to the interests of all these segments, particularly in matters of foreign policy. This function of the Congress is particularly apparent either when the President's foreign policy line fails, when the White House substitutes reversals and panicky reactions to foreign events for a consistent and realistic policy or when the President displays a tendency toward extremist behavior. One example of this is the well-known Clark Amendment, prohibiting the financing of U.S. intervention in Angola. It was passed in 1976 despite the active opposition of President G. Ford. Both Carter and Reagan tried to have it repealed, but were unsuccessful. Of course, the presidency seeks and finds ways of bypassing this law, but the retention of the amendment has prevented more active U.S. interference in the affairs of this independent country.

Congress' correcting function has recently influenced the discussion of Reagan's proposed military budget. The realistic and pragmatic members of the bourgeoisie, who do not agree with Reagan's extremism, are using the Congress, especially the House of Representatives, to let the President know that the current state of the U.S. economy precludes his projected arms buildup with simultaneous cuts in social programs and huge federal budget deficits.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that the presidency is in a much stronger position than the Congress as far as the military budget is concerned. In fact, from the political standpoint, it is often quite difficult for members of Congress to refuse the President's requests for funds for the "maintenance of national security" or to make substantial cuts in them and avoid being accused demagogically of undermining "security."

For this reason, when there is opposition in the Congress to certain aspects of the arms buildup, the discussion often focuses on purely technical matters: "the system does not work," "it is too expensive and unreliable," etc. This occurred when the ABM systems were being discussed and it happened again during the MX debates. Real problems in the coordination of a weapons system with foreign policy and strategic aims are usually not brought up during these discussions. The President can take advantage of this congressional weakness, reflected in the attempted technical justification of political decisions, to insist on getting his own way or on finding an acceptable compromise, and this is what Ronald Reagan was able to do with the MX at the end of last year.

It is no coincidence that Congress has become more active in the area of foreign policy. This is a reflection of the collapse of the two-party consensus on foreign policy issues, the groundlessness of which became evident after the defeat in Vietnam. The attempt to take a more realistic approach to the current world situation in the beginning of the 1970's also did not win complete support in the United States and was undermined by the opponents of

detente. It is hardly likely that a new consensus on foreign policy matters has been achieved at the present time and has been restored to the level of, for instance, the 1950's. Furthermore, the extremism of the Reagan Administration has not only failed to promote its achievement but has probably introduced even more discord.

Speakers here have correctly noted that the increased importance of television and advertising in the presidential campaigns gives the greatest chance of success to the candidate with the best commercial image. Recent events have proved, however, that this certainly does not mean that he has the ability, capability and sufficient experience and knowledge to perform the duties of the president successfully.

V. O. Pechatnov: It seems to me that the phenomenon of the "imperial" presidency was built into the U.S. political system from the very beginning. The "founding fathers" tried to guard the American government against excessive pressure from below and to guard themselves (that is, the landed minority) against possible encroachment from an excessively strong government by creating a complex and carefully balanced machinery of state, based on the principles of "division of authority," "checks and balances" and federalism. The process of political adaptation to socioeconomic changes, however, led to the continued augmentation of the executive branch, especially the presidency itself. This transformation actually took the form of the exaggerated growth of the White House staff, which began to be less controllable by the voters and even by other branches of government. It took the severe shocks of the outcome of the Vietnam War and Watergate to put the constitutional system of "checks and balances" back in effect. The "post-Watergate" reforms, which limited the President's power in budget matters and in the use of the armed forces, temporarily stopped the tendency toward the continuous, uncontrolled growth of presidential power.

As a result, the "balance of power" in U.S. politics in the last 10-15 years has not been in the favor of the "strong presidency," although it cannot function and change successfully without this institution. Furthermore, the need for a "strong presidency" is even greater now that domestic problems have grown more acute and the resources for their resolution have been reduced. Under these conditions, it will be important to effect the substantial revision of traditional methods of government regulation, connected with extremely radical and painful decisions on the redistribution of the limited national resources among various classes and population strata.

Reagan's presidency has become an attempt at a rightwing conservative version of this revision, aimed at the partial dismantling of the "welfare state," the substantial deregulation of business activity and the fundamental reordering of budget priorities in favor of the military-industrial complex, big capital and the most wealthy strata. This has been accomplished with the maximum use of all resources of presidential authority and the skillful manipulation of the Congress and public opinion with the extensive support of monopolies. Nevertheless, the projected scope of the "conservative reconstruction" turned out to be much greater than its actual impact. It is not merely that this policy itself is obviously ineffective; besides this, the presidency is incapable of

surmounting the inertia of the machinery of state and group interests, to which the existing political system offers extensive opportunities to block presidential initiatives. Particularly telling examples are the social security reform, aid to veterans, farmers' subsidies and some other broad-scale social programs which were almost unaffected by the budget cuts, despite the catastrophic budget deficit. The increasing criticism of administration policy in recent months and its declining influence indicate that the Reagan Administration has been unable to revive the "imperial" presidency on the basis of a rightwing conservative program and to put it on a new level of political influence.

V. A. Savel'yev: We need more criteria for the comprehensive analysis of the development and functioning of the presidency. First I would like to say a few words about the long-range tendency toward its reinforcement. This is part of a more general process--the reinforcement of the central government, the unification of all government institutions and the growth of their significance. As for the presidency itself, it must be examined with a view to two parameters, which I will call absolute and relative. The first measures the growth of the entire arsenal of presidential powers in the historical context, the growth of the federal executive branch under the President's jurisdiction and the augmentation of financial and other resources at his disposal.

There can be various fluctuations within a single presidency, and these reflect the relative reinforcement (or weakening) of presidential authority.

In general, it is best to measure the effectiveness of the President's actions when he is seeking approval for his own political program. It is possible to evaluate the success with which presidential initiatives have passed through the Congress, his proportional victories when he has taken a definite stand during the congressional balloting procedure and the effectiveness of his veto power. In particular, the effectiveness of the presidential veto has exceeded 90 percent in almost all periods of U.S. history; in other words, Congress has been able to override only one out of every ten vetoes on the average. The proportion of presidential initiatives winning congressional approval has been 40 percent on the average over the past three decades; the proportion of presidential victories in votes has been 73.4 percent.

Could the effectiveness of presidential performance in recent decades be described as "critical"? It would be hard to say. It is not difficult, however, to compare the degree of influence of various presidents in terms of the indicators of "veto results--initiative results--voting victories":

D. Eisenhower--	98.8,	44.7,	72.2
J. Kennedy--	100,	40,	84.5
L. Johnson--	100,	57.4,	82.8
R. Nixon--	85.7,	33.2,	67
G. Ford--	83.3,	?,	57.7
J. Carter--	93.1,	?,	76.4
R. Reagan--	85.7,	?,	81 (1981-1982)

These data testify, first of all, that the power of presidents varies within specific limits; secondly, that even in the case of presidents whose position has been weakened considerably for one reason or another (L. Johnson, R. Nixon and G. Ford), it has never declined enough to make the institution of the presidency "powerless."

There is no doubt that executive agencies meet the requirements of the monopolistic bourgeoisie to a greater extent than legislative bodies in many respects. Their higher level of social homogeneity, their quick action, their primarily confidential proceedings, their ability to ignore the mood of the public in most cases and their efficient performance of the functions of class oppression and socioeconomic regulation--all of these features of the executive branch naturally appeal to ruling circles.

N. P. Popov: Presidential behavior in the 1970's and 1980's has been influenced by the declining trust of broad segments of the American public in all institutions of authority, including the administration and executive agencies.

The discontent of the masses has been aroused by unemployment, inflation, poverty and racial inequality. This discontent is turning into anger and indignation, and these are certainly directed at a specific target: Various social institutions are being blamed for these unsolved problems. Furthermore, until recently, business and conservative circles were able to transfer much of the blame to the government, the federal administration and the President by turning "big government" into the villain and channeling mass anger in this direction.

The atmosphere of mistrust and criticism of institutions of authority, their leaders and the federal administration has already become the norm. This has been reflected in the failure of presidents of the past two decades to win a mandate for a second term. Under these conditions, the great popularity of presidents during the "honeymoon" should be regarded more as a deviation from the norm, and the substantial decline of their popularity toward the end of their term should be regarded as something more consistent with the existing atmosphere of distrust in the administration and the presidency.

Under the conditions of increasingly acute socioeconomic and political problems and disillusionment with social and governmental institutions and their leaders, many Americans need a symbol evoking optimism, confidence and trust. For much of the population, this symbol can be a President personifying the entire nation, a man with the image of "the father of his country" and a strong and resolute leader.

Nostalgia for the symbolic leader leaves room for manipulation, rhetoric and the use of external data, television shows, symbolic foreign policy actions, gestures and trips, etc. But an "idol" created in this manner can be overthrown if there is too great a discrepancy between the President's image and his actual performance.

The increasing complexity of domestic problems, the unreliability of voter support and the general atmosphere of declining trust in institutions and

leaders have led to a situation in which presidents turn to the sphere of foreign policy in an attempt to generate at least temporary national unity. After all, it is precisely in this sphere that the public is easily aroused and poorly informed. For this reason, the search for international crises to create voter support became a feature of the presidency in the 1970's and 1980's.

N. A. Sakharov: I would like to mention a few aspects of the relations between the President and influential circles in the American business community, which always interact with the presidency.

Each President is backed up by a specific group of influential businessmen on whom he relies in his political career and without whose financial and political support he could not have been a presidential candidate. For example, L. Johnson's nomination was made possible largely by his close ties with Texas businessmen. Nouveau-riche California millionaires stood behind R. Nixon and R. Reagan. J. Carter relied on the support of southern businessmen. People from this community are always part of the administration and are among the closest advisers of their favorites in the Oval Office.

Furthermore, any politician who becomes president must establish a "working relationship" with all influential groups in the American business community in addition to his campaign supporters. For example, J. Carter offered many key positions in his cabinet to people closely connected with the Rockefellers. His most influential unofficial advisers included prominent businessmen heading corporations in the Morgan orbit--J. deButts from AT&T and R. Jones from General Electric. Carter tried to win the support of influential segments of the Jewish bourgeoisie in the United States and made a place in his administration for some of its prominent representatives, such as R. Strauss, F. Klutznik and S. Linowitz.

Influential business circles have various ways of influencing the presidency. First of all, the most influential monopolists and the heads of such leading national business organizations as the Business Council, Business Round Table, the Chamber of Commerce USA and the National Association of Manufacturers have direct access to the President. Furthermore, many businessmen are members of advisory committees or are among the President's unofficial advisers. Besides this, businessmen inform him of their views on various aspects of government policy through a special business liaison office in the White House. The President himself holds regular consultations with leading businessmen on a broad range of foreign and domestic policy issues and often makes policy statements at meetings of the Business Council, the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers.

Business circles with considerable influence in the Congress can influence the presidency through congressmen and lobbyists.

The President's party affiliation has a definite effect on his relations with businessmen. Business always trusts a Republican President more than a Democrat. The latter's base in the business community is much narrower, although the level of corporate profits has often been higher under Democrats than under Republicans.

Political practices in the United States are such that no direct representative of the American monopolistic elite has been able to win a presidential election. All of the prominent businessmen who have made a bid for the presidential nomination (N. Rockefeller, G. Romney, J. Connally and others) have been defeated in the primaries and at party conventions. The candidates have generally been professional politicians--J. Kennedy, L. Johnson, R. Nixon and G. Ford. But no matter who is elected president, he inevitably becomes involved in the machinery of interaction by influential business circles with the White House.

An important feature of U.S. state-monopoly capitalism is the fact that cooperation between the private sector and the government is more likely to take place on an informal basis than within the framework of institutional channels, as in the case of, for example, some West European countries and Japan.

A. A. Kokoshin: The main purpose of this discussion was to determine the distinctive features of presidential power and the limits and possibilities of its influence on the political process in the United States with a view to tendencies of varying duration. The attempt to put new features of the interrelations between the presidency and other government institutions within a historical context and to assess the balance of power between the White House and the huge bureaucracy it has created has been productive. In short, the discussion was supposed to answer this question: What place does the institution of the presidency occupy in the U.S. machinery of state?

If we summarize all of the opinions expressed here, the following picture comes to light.

The presidency is the central link in the American political system. As speakers noted, however, although the main segments of the ruling class retain dominant positions in all spheres, they will tolerate a stronger executive or legislative branch, simultaneously making energetic use of the judiciary, as long as the resulting policy line is not contrary to the interests of the monopolistic bourgeoisie as a whole.

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SOVIET-CANADIAN 'ROUND TABLE'

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[Report on first Soviet-Canadian roundtable discussion in July 1983, in Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] The first Soviet-Canadian "round table" was held in the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies (ISKAN) in the second half of July. It was attended by a group of prominent Canadian scientists and public and political spokesmen: George Ignatiev, president of the University of Toronto, the largest university in the country, who served for many years as Canada's permanent representative to the United Nations, NATO and the Committee on Disarmament (delegation head); Walter Gordon, president of York University, former Canadian minister of finance, prominent businessman and political and public spokesman with considerable influence in the ruling Liberal Party; Robert Reford, president of an international relations consulting firm, formerly the director of the Canadian Institute of International Relations; Professor Roddick Byers from York University, administrator of the university's strategic studies program and director of scientific affairs of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.

The Soviet side was represented by Academician G. A. Arbatov, director of ISKAN (delegation head); L. A. Bagramov, ISKAN department chief; V. I. Gantman, sector chief at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations; V. V. Zhurkin, ISKAN deputy director; N. N. Izvekov, consultant to the CPSU Central Committee International Information Department; M. A. Mil'shteyn, ISKAN sector chief; S. F. Molochkov, ISKAN sector chief; N. V. Mostovets, sector chief in the CPSU Central Committee International Department; V. M. Sukhodrev, deputy chief of the Second European Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In accordance with earlier agreements, current international events and problems in bilateral Soviet-Canadian relations were discussed.

From the very beginning, the Canadians expressed interest in such matters as the state of Soviet-U.S. relations, the causes and implications of their deterioration, the prospects for arms control, limitation and reduction, and Canada's place and role in the relations between its two powerful neighbors on the south

and north. The Canadians unanimously underscored the growing threat posed to their country by the continuation of the arms race, particularly in the case of strategic arms.

The Canadians were not unanimous in their views on the ways and methods of slowing down and curbing the arms race, particularly with regard to specific forms of Canadian participation in this process. The most resolute position was taken by W. Gordon, who had publicly proposed that Canada become a nuclear-free zone not long before his arrival in the USSR and who discussed this idea in greater detail at the ISKAN meeting.

Gordon's proposal was naturally considered from various vantage points during the conference. Soviet participants noted that the initiative of creating nuclear-free zones in several parts of the world had already received the fundamental approval of the Soviet Government. As for the Canadians, they were in favor of the idea but expressed different opinions on the possibility of its implementation.

The Soviet participants in the roundtable discussion explained and substantiated the principled position and specific proposals of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, aimed at alleviating and eliminating the threat of a nuclear world conflict and at strengthening peace and international security. They also subjected the policy of the current U.S. administration and the other Western governments supporting it to logical criticism. In particular, they revealed the groundlessness of the notorious "dual" NATO strategy with regard to nuclear missiles in Western Europe.

The present state and future prospects of Soviet-Canadian relations were the subject of definite interest. Although Soviet participants expressed satisfaction with the current state of these relations, they pointed out unutilized opportunities for the further improvement of trade, economic, scientific, technical and other forms of cooperation between our countries.

They stressed that progress in this area will depend primarily on the Canadian side. For example, the consensus was that exchanges in the sphere of science and technology have been in an unsatisfactory state since the Canadian Conservative government curtailed them in January 1980.

It is interesting that these relations have not been resumed as yet by the Liberal government, despite the statement by the head of this government, P. Trudeau, at the end of 1982 about the need to normalize scientific contacts.

Canadian participants responded by expressing their intention to promote the resumption and development of Soviet-Canadian scientific cooperation to the maximum.

The discussion concluded with an exchange of views on the prospects for the further development of this form of contact between Soviet and Canadian scientists and public and political spokesmen. The participants in this roundtable discussion unanimously acknowledged that the first meeting had been successful and that joint efforts should be made to consolidate these

positive results. The Canadians suggested that the next roundtable discussion be held in Canada in 1984.

When the proceedings were over, the Canadian participants were received in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On 20 July W. Gordon was received by Secretary M. S. Gorbachev of the CPSU Central Committee, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

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